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MAPPING CITIZENSHIP:
STATUS, MEMBERSHIP, AND THE PATH IN BETWEEN
D. Carolina Núñez*
Abstract
The concept of citizenship poses an interesting asymmetry: though all
citizens receive the same rights and obligations on equal terms, citizenship
is not distributed to individuals on equal terms. In the United States, some
are citizens by virtue of birth within the national territory or birth to citizen
parents. Others must undergo the process of naturalization. Different
citizenship rules appear to solve for different variables, and it is not clear
whether and how those variables relate to one another.
This Article begins unraveling the paradox. It argues that the
apparent paradox results from a failure to understand the relationship
between citizenship’s formal and substantive dimensions. The Article
reconceptualizes citizenship by decoupling substantive and formal
citizenship. Formal citizenship is not a static condition that is or even
ought to be synonymous with more abstract notions of membership and
belonging. Rather, formal citizenship is a path that leads toward
substantive citizenship, and formal citizenship rules serve as entrances to
that path. Mapping and understanding the way that formal citizenship can
relate to substantive citizenship can inform contemporary debates about
citizenship, immigration, and membership.
This Article offers a typology of the ways in which formal citizenship
can relate to substantive citizenship. Citizenship rules can play a
“descriptive” role by conferring citizenship on individuals who have
already achieved some measure of substantive citizenship. But citizenship
can also encourage an individual’s development of the qualities that make
someone a desirable member of the polity. That is, citizenship rules may
be “prescriptive” in that they distribute citizenship to individuals who are
not yet fully substantive citizens. Citizenship rules may also be
“predictive” in nature: they bestow citizenship on individuals who are
likely to become substantive citizens and help facilitate that development.
Other citizenship rules operate to claim individuals without regard to
notions of membership and belonging; these may be fairly described as
“conscriptive” citizenship rules. To illustrate the value of the proposed
framework, this Article uses it to recast two contemporary debates that
touch on citizenship: challenges to territorial birthright citizenship and
the creation of a “path to citizenship” for DREAMers.

477

478

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of citizenship poses an interesting asymmetry: though all citizens
receive the same rights and obligations on equal terms, citizenship is not distributed
to individuals on equal terms. In the United States, some are citizens by virtue of
circumstance—birth within the national territory1 or birth to citizen parents.2 Others
must prove their fitness for citizenship through the process of naturalization.3 All
citizens, however, receive the same rights on the same terms,4 regardless of their
path to citizenship.5 As I will explain in this Article, the existence of these varying
rules, though at first puzzling, is a useful feature of U.S. citizenship law. This feature
operates to better integrate immigrant communities, helps marginalized individuals
gain the tools to develop a shared sense of identity with fellow citizens, and avoids
the dangers of a tiered society where subsets of residents remain ineligible for
*

© 2016 D. Carolina Núñez. Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School,
Brigham Young University. Thanks to Kif Augustine-Adams, Derek Bambauer, Ian
Bartrum, Susan Bieber Coutin, Aliza Cover, Rose Cuison-Villazor, Carissa Hessick, Sarah
Haan, Alan Hyde, Eric Jensen, Margaret Kwoka, David Martin, David Moore, Hiroshi
Motomura, Michael Olivas, Shaakirrah Sanders, Gordon Smith, Paul Stancil, Michalyn
Steele, and Leti Volpp for invaluable feedback on earlier drafts of this Article. I am also
grateful for the helpful comments provided by the University of Notre Dame Law School
faculty during a workshop of an earlier draft. Travis Hunt, Nathan Sumbot, Kimi Orr, Felicity
Murphy, John Gibbons, and Nicholas Beatty provided excellent research and editing
assistance.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2
See Immigration & Nationality Act §§ 301, 309, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2012)
[hereinafter I.N.A.].
3
See I.N.A. § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1427.
4
Of course, I do not mean to say that all citizens actually experience equal citizenship,
but rather that the law—in the abstract—treats all citizens equally. Several scholars of critical
race theory, feminist legal theory, and other fields have discussed the lived realities and
second-class citizenship of many different types of citizens. Kevin Johnson, for example, has
traced the lived second-class status of people of color in a world of facially neutral laws. See,
e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and
California’s Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70
WASH. L. REV. 629, 629 (1995) [hereinafter Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics]
(analyzing California’s Proposition 187 and its impact on immigration politics); Kevin R.
Johnson, “Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”?: Assimilation and the Mexican-American
Experience, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1259 (1997) [hereinafter Johnson, “Melting Pot” or
“Ring of Fire”?] (discussing the assimilation difficulties of Mexican Americans). Katherine
Bartlett has highlighted how females can experience actual gender discrimination caused by
facially neutral laws. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y
1, 6 (1994). Alexander Aleinikoff has also proposed that even ensuring that laws are
“colorblind” is not enough to remedy the second-class experience of minority citizens.
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1062
(1991).
5
For a brief discussion of two exceptions to the principle of equal citizenship, see the
text accompanying infra notes 69–70.
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citizenship until they have proven to the satisfaction of the majority their worthiness
for citizenship.
But to fully explore how the coexistence of separate citizenship rules that
impose different requirements on individuals can advance integration and shared
identity, I first acknowledge the puzzle that varying citizenship rules creates. After
all, in light of well-accepted notions of distributive justice, rights would be afforded
based on indicators related to the right being distributed.6 In an ideal world, we
would expect citizenship rules to identify individuals who are desirable members of
the polity—however that might be defined—in a substantive way.7 But it is not clear
how the various paths to U.S. citizenship qualify an individual for the same package
of rights and benefits.8 A two-day-old infant born in Ohio to French immigrants and
a forty-five-year-old school teacher from Vietnam who completes the naturalization
process are both citizens of the United States under the law. A five-year-old child
born and living in Argentina a year after her parents—both of them U.S. citizens—
moved there to work is also a citizen. Though the naturalized schoolteacher was
required to demonstrate basic English proficiency and knowledge of U.S. history
and civics,9 the Ohio-born infant cannot speak at all, and the Argentina-born child
may speak Spanish rather than English. Neither knows anything of history and
civics. In fact, there is no guarantee that the children will ever be able to meet the
same requirements that the Vietnamese schoolteacher met in order to be
naturalized.10 Yet all three individuals, each of whom qualified for citizenship under
very different rules, are entitled to the same citizenship—and its corresponding
rights—at the moment of birth or naturalization. It is not clear that any of the
individuals would qualify for citizenship under any rule of citizenship except the
one under which he or she acquired citizenship. Once again, this is not to say that
6

See infra Part II.
Several scholars have made arguments, both generally and with respect to particular
citizenship rules, based on just such an assumption. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying
U.S. Naturalization Policies, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 237, 237–38 (1994); Ayelet Shachar, The
Worth of Citizenship in an Unequal World, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 367, 373 (2007)
(criticizing birthright citizenship rules for failing to limit the distribution of citizenship to
individuals who identify with the state’s political ideals of freedom and liberty or some other
substantive characteristic); see also MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 50 (1983) (asserting that membership in a community, including
citizenship, depends on a “sense of relatedness and mutuality”); Mark Tushnet, Creedal
Citizenship, 9 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, 1 (2011) (suggesting that citizenship ought to
relate to adherence to substantive values: “By creedal citizenship I mean something fairly
modest, though important: a set of beliefs, not necessarily religious in content, but in which
the adherent has some significant degree of emotional as well as cognitive investment.”).
8
See Neuman, supra note 7, at 247–48 (“In a coherent system of citizenship law, one
might expect continuities between the approaches to citizenship expressed in these other
parts of citizenship law and the approaches expressed in naturalization policy. On the other
hand, it might be too much to expect U.S. citizenship law to display coherence.”).
9
See I.N.A. § 312, 8 U.S.C. § 1423.
10
See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT:
ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 117 (1985).
7
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any one of these hypothetical individuals is a less legitimate citizen than the others.
In fact, this Article concludes otherwise. Rather, these hypotheticals merely
highlight what appears to be a puzzling distribution of citizenship that calls into
question the very rationale for the concept of citizenship.11 Why do citizenship rules
appear to solve for different variables if citizenship provides the same rights and
benefits to all citizens? Unraveling this paradox helps highlight how each rule works
in conjunction with the others in a way that maximizes the potential for individuals’
development of meaningful membership in the United States.
Though scholars have not explicitly discussed the paradoxical distribution of
equal citizenship on unequal terms,12 I argue it lies at the heart of many
contemporary inquiries into citizenship law. Commentators, however, have
analyzed citizenship through very focused lenses that allow detailed discussion of
some aspects of citizenship law,13 but provide little context or even recognition of
the underlying paradox. For example, some scholars have explored the citizenship
of children:14 Do children exercise a different kind of citizenship than do adults?15
Why do children have citizenship at all? While such scholarship centers on
children’s citizenship, it implicitly raises more general questions about whether
citizenship rules adequately distribute citizenship to individuals who are fit for the
11

Stephen H. Legomsky, Why Citizenship?, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 279, 285 (1994) (arguing
that all commentary on citizenship builds on this “fundamental question: What is
accomplished by having a citizenship concept at all? Why, in other words, should the law
affirmatively classify all earthlings as citizens or noncitizens and create rights, duties, and
disabilities that hinge on that distinction?”).
12
A few, however, have at least recognized the existence of this question. See, e.g.,
Neuman, supra note 7, at 247–48.
13
Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt describe the tendency of scholars to focus on
particular facets of citizenship as “balkanization.” Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt,
Citizenship Talk: Bridging the Gap Between Immigration and Race Perspectives, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 2493, 2494 (2007).
14
See Jacqueline Bhabha, The Citizenship Deficit: On Being a Citizen Child, 46 DEV.
53, 53 (2003); Ruth Lister, Why Citizenship: Where, When and How Children,
8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 693, 693 (2007); Jeremy Roche, Children: Rights,
Participation and Citizenship, 6 CHILDHOOD 475, 475 (1999).
15
See, e.g., DAVID CUTLER & ROGER FROST, TAKING THE INITIATIVE: PROMOTING
YOUNG PEOPLE’S INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC DECISION MAKING IN THE UK 8 (2001)
(discussing the concept of children as “citizens in waiting”); Madeleine Arnot & Jo-Anne
Dillabough, Introduction, in CHALLENGING DEMOCRACY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
ON GENDER, EDUCATION AND CITIZENSHIP 1, 12 (Madeleine Arnot & Jo-Anne Dillabough
eds., 2000) (describing children as “learner citizens”); Ruth Lister et al., Young People and
Citizenship, in YOUTH POLICY AND SOCIAL INCLUSION: CRITICAL DEBATES WITH YOUNG
PEOPLE 33, 33 (Monica Barry ed., 2005) (proposing that children are “citizens in the
making”); Michael Wyness et al., Childhood, Politics and Ambiguity: Towards an Agenda
for Children’s Political Inclusion, 38 SOC. 81, 82 (2004) (suggesting that children are
“apprentice citizens”). But see Elizabeth F. Cohen, Neither Seen nor Heard: Children’s
Citizenship in Contemporary Democracies, 9 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 221, 236 (2005) (“Liberal
democracies owe children a more carefully defined and judiciously governed political status
that acknowledges their needs alongside their weaknesses and vulnerabilities.”).
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exercise of citizenship. More broadly, it highlights the reality that not all citizens are
identically qualified or prepared to exercise citizenship rights and obligations despite
being citizens.
Likewise, many critiques of birthright citizenship arise from the paradox of
equal citizenship distributed on unequal terms. Why does the U.S. border dictate
citizenship at birth? How are individuals born inside the border more deserving than
those born outside?16 What about individuals who are born inside the United States
as a result of a parent’s unauthorized crossing of the border?17 At bottom, these
questions challenge territorial birthright citizenship’s ability to identify individuals
who are fit for the same citizenship that other citizens have.
Commentators have also focused on particular aspects of citizenship, including
citizenship as rights,18 citizenship as participation,19 citizenship as work,20
citizenship as standing,21 and citizenship as identity.22 But few have discussed the
relationships among these different facets, perhaps because these concepts do not
always coincide. After all, an individual may experience citizenship as rights, but
fail to experience citizenship as participation. Why are rights distributed to
individuals who do not or cannot participate? Why not distribute rights to those who
do participate? These questions cannot be answered with reference to a single facet
of citizenship.
My purpose here is to widen the lens. My interest is not in the effect of a single
citizenship rule, in a single facet of citizenship, or in a particular group’s lack of
access to citizenship or citizenship rights, though my analysis sheds light on those
issues. Rather, my interest lies in the very existence of multiple, disparate rules that
purport to grant the very same citizenship and what it says about citizenship
generally and in the United States. Here, I take a high-altitude view of the citizenship
landscape to create a conceptual map. Rather than focus on a single rule or aspect of
16

See, e.g., AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL
INEQUALITY 4–5 (2009) (challenging the view that citizenship should be based on the
location of one’s birth).
17
See, e.g., SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 118 (suggesting that U.S. citizenship
is not guaranteed to children of “illegal aliens and ‘nonimmigrant’ aliens”).
18
See, e.g., T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS AND OTHER ESSAYS 47,
85 (1950) (discussing the “rapidly developing concept of the rights of citizenship on the
structure of social inequality”).
19
See, e.g., Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent
Work on Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHICS 352, 353 (1994) (describing one meaning of
citizenship as “‘citizenship-as-desirable-activity,’ where the extent and quality of one’s
citizenship is a function of one’s participation in that community”).
20
See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55
UCLA L. REV. 1161, 1191 (2008) (arguing that “work functions as an important pathway to
citizenship as a form of belonging”).
21
See, e.g., JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 2
(1991) (“[C]itizenship in America has never been just a matter of agency and empowerment,
but also of social standing as well.”).
22
See, e.g., Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 19, at 353 (calling for “‘a theory of
citizenship’ that focuses on the identity . . . of individual citizens”).
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citizenship—a single peak or valley in the landscape—I explore the relationship
between citizenship rules and the substance of citizenship itself—the broader
geography of the landscape. This is not to say that individual rules and aspects of
citizenship are not worthwhile units of analysis. They are. But a more holistic
understanding of citizenship can give greater context and nuance to the details of
citizenship.23 Here, I examine the coexistence of seemingly dissonant citizenship
rules to help illuminate the nature of citizenship and its relationship to notions of
membership and belonging.
In this Article, I advance existing commentary on citizenship in two ways. First,
I reconceptualize citizenship by disentangling “formal citizenship,” the governmentissued legal status, from more abstract notions of membership and belonging, which
I call “substantive citizenship.” I argue that, though formal citizenship and
substantive citizenship are inextricably tied, they are not synonymous and need not
be.24 Second, I offer a typology that explains how formal citizenship and substantive
citizenship relate to each other. This, in turn, allows formal citizenship to emerge as
a dynamic trajectory (rather than a static condition) that can promote, facilitate, and
preserve an individual’s development of substantive citizenship. In that sense,
formal citizenship can be a culmination of an individual’s development of
substantive citizenship or a catalyst of that development.
To achieve these purposes, my Article proceeds in four parts. In Part II, below,
I begin by discussing the concept of membership and argue that legal rights and
benefits can be thought of as the privileges of certain types of membership. This
preliminary discussion of membership contextualizes Part III’s description of
citizenship, generally, and U.S. citizenship law. There, I argue that citizenship in the
United States appears, at first glance, to be distributed in a paradoxical fashion and
against well-accepted norms of distributive justice.
In Part IV, I argue that the apparent paradox of equal citizenship distributed on
unequal terms stems from an inadequate understanding of citizenship. I argue that
formal citizenship—the legal status—must be understood as separate and distinct
from substantive citizenship—a more abstract sense of membership and belonging.
Further, I introduce a typology that categorizes the various ways that formal
citizenship can relate to substantive citizenship. In particular, I highlight the
transformative power of formal citizenship. By conferring citizenship to an
individual, the state provides rights, privileges, and benefits that, in turn, help the
individual develop substantive citizenship.
23

Jennifer Gordon and R.A. Lenhardt have described the balkanization of citizenship
scholarship: “Because ‘citizenship’ is used to mean so many things, explorations of
citizenship in different fields may run on parallel tracks, never intersecting, even though each
set of analyses might benefit greatly from interaction with others.” Gordon & Lenhardt,
supra note 13, at 2494. In this Article, I help overcome this “balkanization,” not by directly
connecting any particular tracks of scholarship, but by constructing a large-scale framework
that accommodates and undergirds many tracks.
24
Using terms from citizenship theory, I might recharacterize this: the thin conception
of citizenship—the formal legal label—is not synonymous with a thick conception of
citizenship as a more substantive view of citizenship as activity or identity.
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Part V illustrates the value of this typology by translating several important
contemporary debates about citizenship into the framework proposed in this Article.
While the typology advanced in this Article has application outside of the United
States—in fact, I use examples from outside the United States to help illustrate the
typology—I limit myself to U.S.-specific examples in this Part. First, I highlight
how an understanding of the various ways in which formal citizenship relates to
substantive citizenship can inform and give substance to current and historical
debates about the distribution of citizenship, including those surrounding the
DREAM Act and proposals to withhold citizenship from the U.S.-born children of
undocumented immigrants. In Part VI, I offer some brief conclusions and questions
for the future.
II. MEMBERSHIP
Basic notions of membership are a rich and driving force of individual and
group identity, the distribution of rights, and the imposition of burdens and
responsibilities.25 By membership, I mean the abstract—but intuitive—notion of
belonging.26 On the most basic level, we are members of families, communities,
cultures, and churches. More mundane examples include membership in fitness
clubs, farming co-ops, and book clubs. In all these cases, membership suggests a
sense of belonging that often shapes individuals’ identity.
In addition, membership secures privileges that are unavailable to nonmembers.
That is what ultimately makes membership desirable. Membership in a fitness club,
for example, guarantees use of the club’s health and fitness equipment. Farming coop members may have access to fresh produce each week, and book club members
enjoy camaraderie and stimulating discussion of books. But these benefits are not
free; membership also entails obligation. Whether it is by paying dues, working on
the co-op farm, or hosting book-club gatherings, members undertake some
obligation.
In all of the examples mentioned above, the membership entity must make
decisions about who may be a member and who remains a nonmember. A fitness
club may limit membership to individuals who show a willingness and ability to pay
for one year of membership. This helps the fitness club ensure that it can continue
to offer membership benefits to all its members for the coming year. A farming coop may select individuals with farming experience or who own farming equipment.
This helps the co-op maximize the possibility that it will produce fresh produce for
all its members. A sports team may select individuals who demonstrate skill in the
sport. This allows the team the best chance to engage in competitive matches—one
of the very benefits of membership.
25

PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION
151 (2008) (“All communities set terms for membership.”).
26
Elsewhere, I have written extensively about notions of membership and belonging.
My discussion here tracks and echoes these prior writings. See, e.g., D. Carolina Núñez,
Fractured Membership: Deconstructing Territoriality to Secure Rights and Remedies for the
Undocumented Worker, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 817, 824 (2010).
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These examples highlight an intuitive idea: membership entities logically select
members based on the substance of the “club” at issue. This might take one of many
forms: a membership entity might make membership decisions based on individuals’
ability to bear the responsibilities of membership, a common interest with other
members, or a common goal. It would seem absurd and unjust for the fitness club to
offer membership based on musical ability, the farming co-op to select members
based on applicants’ fashion preferences, or for the book club to base its decisions
on shoe size.
The concept of membership extends beyond the types of examples mentioned
above. Indeed, legal rights can be thought of as benefits of membership. Whenever
a state distributes a good—or, in legal parlance, a right—the state sorts members
from nonmembers. When a state issues a driver’s license, for example, it essentially
admits that person as a “member” of an abstract driving “club.” We would expect
the state to select its drivers based on criteria that relate to the responsibilities the
driver will undertake and the benefits that the driver will enjoy. It comes as no
surprise, then, that a state limits membership in this “club” to individuals who can
properly see roadside signs and understand and obey traffic laws. Such an individual
is likely to help keep the roads safe, a benefit that all license holders enjoy. We
would instinctively reject a rule that issued driver’s licenses to individuals based on
wealth, cooking abilities, or hobbies.
These principles of membership coincide with Michael Walzer’s theory of
distributive justice—that every social good should be distributed to individuals
based on criteria that relate to the very social good being distributed.27 In this state
of complex equality, the distribution of a good is “just or unjust relative to the social
meanings of the goods at stake.”28 A distribution of a good based on criteria that are
relevant to a different social good would constitute an unjust distribution. “Every
social good or set of goods constitutes, as it were, a distributive sphere within which
only certain criteria and arrangements are appropriate.”29 Each good is distributed in
its own “sphere of justice.”30
III. CITIZENSHIP AND MEMBERSHIP
The state’s distribution of citizenship is a paradigmatic exercise in sorting
members from nonmembers. Members acquire access to a suite of rights and
privileges31 that are exclusively reserved for citizens—the benefits of membership
27

See WALZER, supra note 7, at 20 (“No social good x should be distributed to men
and women who possess some other good y merely because they possess y and without
regard to the meaning of x.”); see also BERNARD WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF THE SELF:
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1956–1972, at 248 (1973) (“[O]ne might hope for a society in which
there existed both a fair, rational, and appropriate distribution of these goods . . . .”).
28
WALZER, supra note 7, at 9.
29
Id. at 10.
30
Id.
31
In this Article, I often refer to citizenship rights, privileges, and benefits. I use these
to refer generically to the state-guaranteed advantages of citizenship. Others have undertaken
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in the “club.” In a Walzerian world, citizenship would be distributed to individuals
who somehow demonstrate qualities or characteristics that relate to the substance of
citizenship. This might take the form of distributing citizenship to individuals who
demonstrate the ability to take on the obligations and responsibilities of citizenship.
Or citizenship might be distributed to individuals who share a common quality or
characteristic. Ultimately, the criteria would depend on the substantive meaning of
citizenship in that state.
Even without defining the substantive meaning of citizenship in the United
States, its rules are puzzling. The coexistence of separate rules providing citizenship
based on entirely different criteria seems to pose a problem for the principles of
membership advocated here and elsewhere. What is it about birth within the U.S.
territory (jus soli), birth to U.S. citizen parents (jus sanguinis), or the fulfillment of
a list of language, morality, civics, and other requirements (naturalization) that
qualify individuals for the very same citizenship? The three approaches to
citizenship appear to produce results that are at odds with each other. Each rule may
produce citizens that could not have qualified and would never qualify under either
of the remaining rules. Yet the law behaves as though citizens are identically
qualified in that it offers each individual an identical package of rights and
obligations.
In this Part, I explore this puzzle in detail. Here, I discuss the concept of
citizenship, both abstractly and with reference to U.S. law, to more fully explore the
dissonance in U.S. citizenship law and offer some preliminary possibilities that
explain this dissonance. This sets the stage for Part IV, which offers a
reconceptualization of citizenship that helps explain and even legitimize that
dissonance.
A. Citizenship in Multiple Dimensions
Perhaps because of its close association with abstract notions of belonging, the
term “citizenship” can refer to many different concepts.32 Commentators have, for
instance, discussed citizenship as social standing,33 citizenship as participation,34

a more nuanced categorization of types of citizenship rights, but such distinctions are not
necessary in the analysis here. See Thomas Janoski & Brian Gran, Political Citizenship:
Foundations of Rights, in HANDBOOK OF CITIZENSHIP STUDIES 13, 16 (Engin F. Isin & Bryan
S. Turner eds., 2002) (describing Hohfeld’s theory of rights to distinguish between
citizenship liberties, claims, powers, and immunities).
32
Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 13, at 2494 (“Because citizenship has so many
dimensions, it is important to be precise about which dimensions are under discussion at any
given moment.”).
33
SHKLAR, supra note 21, at 2.
34
Id. at 3.
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citizenship as rights,35 citizenship as identity,36 and citizenship as status,37 among
other things. These various dimensions of citizenship might be grouped into two
broad categories: formal and substantive citizenship.38
1. Formal Citizenship
By formal citizenship, I refer to the dimensions of citizenship controlled by the
state and administered through the law. The state exerts exclusive control over only
two dimensions of citizenship. First, the state has exclusive control over the
distribution of the formal, legal status of nationality.39 This is not to say that the state
completely ignores the contributions that citizens can or will make, citizens’ sense
of identity, the social standing that citizenship brings, or any other facets of
citizenship. In fact, as I will argue in Part IV, citizenship rules can help promote and
incentivize other dimensions of citizenship. But the state cannot distribute any type
of citizenship other than legal nationality, and individuals cannot exert power over
the distribution of legal nationality. Second, the state has exclusive control over the
legal rights that its citizens enjoy.40 Again, this power may allow the state to
influence other dimensions of citizenship, but the state does not have the power to
unilaterally determine or create those other dimensions of citizenship. Rather, they
are subject to a variety of forces ranging from individual choice to happenstance.
These state-centric dimensions of citizenship—the bestowal of citizenship in
conjunction with the state’s attachment of rights to that citizenship—make up formal
citizenship.41 As discussed below, there is broad consensus on the normative
qualities of the formal legal concept of citizenship. On the most basic level, formal
citizenship should do at least two things: (a) guarantee a set of rights to its holders
and (b) provide those rights equally to all citizens.

35

See Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447,
452–53, 455–56 (2000) (distinguishing between citizenship as rights, legal status, political
activity, and identity/solidarity).
36
See id.
37
Id.
38
The distinction between formal citizenship and substantive citizenship overlaps but
does not coincide with several other categorizations of citizenship. ENGIN F. ISIN & PATRICIA
K. WOOD, CITIZENSHIP & IDENTITY 4–5 (1999) (dividing citizenship into “a set of practices
(cultural, symbolic and economic) and a bundle of rights and duties (civil, political, and
social)”).
39
SHKLAR, supra note 21, at 3–4.
40
Janoski & Gran, supra note 31, at 13 (“[C]itizenship rights are legislated by
governmental decision-making bodies, promulgated by executive orders, or enacted and later
enforced by legal decisions.”).
41
Rogers M. Smith, Modern Citizenship, in HANDBOOK OF CITIZENSHIP STUDIES, supra
note 31, at 105, 105 (describing the modern conception of citizenship as bestowing
nationality on individuals and guaranteeing basic rights).
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(a) Rights
Formal citizenship’s most recognizable feature and most widely recognized
dimension is its guarantee of legal rights.42 Citizenship rights are featured in
numerous commentaries on citizenship. T.H. Marshall, whose seminal work on
citizenship became the starting point for subsequent citizenship scholarship,
famously categorized citizenship rights into civil, social, and political.43 While
typologies vary, the normative model remains the same: citizenship has substance
only if it secures rights.
In the United States, citizenship guarantees individuals the full suite of rights
and benefits provided by the state. While many of these rights are also available to
certain noncitizens, some are reserved exclusively for citizens.44 Citizens, for
instance, enjoy the exclusive right to vote,45 the right to remain within the national
territory indefinitely, the ability to enter and leave the United States on a preferred
basis,46 protection when the citizen is abroad,47 access to welfare benefits on a
preferred basis,48 the ability to petition the government for the admission of

42

T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7
CONST. COMMENT. 9, 12–13 (1990) (“[M]ost Americans would probably recognize the
possession of political rights as the most significant difference between aliens and citizens.”);
Janoski & Gran, supra note 31, at 13. (“Citizenship is grounded in the guarantee of legal and
political protections from raw coercive power . . . .”).
43
Marshall defined civil citizenship as “the rights necessary for individual freedom—
liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to
conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice.” MARSHALL, supra note 18, at 10. He
defined political citizenship and the right to participate in the political processes and social
citizenship as “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security
to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civili[z]ed being
according to the standards prevailing in the society.” Id. at 11. Some of these are not
necessarily accurately described as the rights of formal citizenship in the U.S. because those
rights are not exclusive to citizens in the U.S.
44
For an argument that U.S. citizenship rights are only minimal, see SPIRO, supra note
25, at 81 (“[C]itizenship makes very little difference. What the state extracts from you and
what it owes you are minimally contingent on citizenship status. Citizens are privileged in
only a few dwindling contexts.”); see also Peter H. Schuck, Liberal Citizenship, in
HANDBOOK OF CITIZENSHIP STUDIES, supra note 31, at 131, 139 (“[A]lmost all of the rights
of US citizens are also enjoyed by legal resident aliens.”).
45
For an account of the historical U.S. practice of allowing noncitizens to vote, see
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN
THE UNITED STATES 33–40 (2000) (discussing history of noncitizen voting in United States).
46
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Between Principles and Politics: U.S. Citizenship Policy,
in FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD 119, 119
(T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2000) (“Other benefits accompany
citizenship, such as eligibility for a passport, the right to not be deported, and the ability to
seek protection by their home government when traveling in a foreign country.”).
47
Id.
48
Id.
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noncitizen relatives,49 and more. It is the guarantee of rights unavailable to others—
its very exclusivity—that helps make citizenship desirable and socially
consequential.50
Before moving on to the second universal feature of citizenship, it is worth
noting that the state also has exclusive control over the imposition of citizenship
responsibilities and obligations.51 Public rhetoric often talks of “the rights and
obligations of citizenship.” This is the corollary to the state’s exclusive power to
secure rights. However, modern citizenship systems impose relatively few burdens.
Among those, some states subject citizens to compulsory voting requirements,52
mandatory military service,53 and burdensome extraterritorial taxation,54 but U.S.
citizenship carries relatively few legal obligations.55 Though there is a sociocultural
expectation that good citizens will vote, voting is not required in the United States,
and voter turnout is often disappointing.56 While jury duty, on the other hand, is
49

I.N.A. § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (stating that while legal permanent residents
have the right to petition for noncitizen spouses and unmarried children, citizens may also
petition for their noncitizen parents, married children (and their spouses and children under
twenty-one), and siblings (and their spouses and children under twenty-one)).
50
Justice Byron White justified the exclusion of aliens from access to certain rights on
this basis: “The exclusion of aliens from basic governmental processes is not a deficiency in
the democratic system but a necessary consequence of the community’s process of political
self-definition.” Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982).
51
See generally CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN, LIBERAL RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES: ESSAYS ON CITIZENSHIP AND SOVEREIGNTY 1 (Oxford Press 2014).
52
For an examination of Australia’s compulsory voting system, see M. Mackerras & I.
McAllister, Compulsory Voting, Party Stability and Electoral Advantage in Australia, 18
ELECTORAL STUD. 217, 223–24 (1999). For an analysis of Brazil’s compulsory voting
requirement, see Timothy J. Power & J. Timmons Roberts, Compulsory Voting, Invalid
Ballots, and Abstention in Brazil, 48 POL. RES. Q. 795, 797–98 (1995).
53
Israel, Brazil, and Finland require compulsory military service. See The World
Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/fields/2024.html [https://perma.cc/5EXA-JM9S] (last visited May 1, 2016); see
also Kari Laitinen, National or International? Contending Discourses on Finnish
Conscription, in THE CHANGING FACE OF EUROPEAN CONSCRIPTION 41, 41 (Pertti Joenniemi
ed., 2006) (discussing how Finnish conscription contains stronger mythical elements
compared with other Nordic countries); Hanne Eggen Røislien, Religion and Military
Conscription: The Case of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), 39 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y
213, 216–18 (2012) (discussing how the Israel Defense Force operates as a conscript army
and drafts its individual members).
54
China has worldwide taxation requirements for citizens, which it plans to enforce
more strictly in the future. See Keith Bradsher, China Wants Taxes Paid by Citizens Living
Afar, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015) (on file with the Utah Law Review),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/business/international/china-starts-enforcing-tax-lawfor-citizens-working-abroad.html.
55
Schuck, supra note 44, at 131.
56
See Editorial, The Worst Voter Turnout in 72 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2014) (on
file with the Utah Law Review), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/opinion/the-worstvoter-turnout-in-72-years.html.
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mandatory, the law provides ample opportunities for avoiding it.57 The United States
does require male citizens to register for selective service in the military, but this
requirement is not tied exclusively to citizenship.58 Beyond male citizens, the
requirement extends to all permanently residing males, including legal permanent
residents and undocumented immigrants, who meet specified criteria.59 U.S.
citizenship, then, is not particularly burdensome. This rights-heavy model is typical
in modern states.
(b) Equality
Beyond guaranteeing rights, however, citizenship should guarantee them on an
equal basis.60 As Rogers Brubaker explained, citizens exercise their rights in a
“region of legal equality”61 such that all citizens are entitled to the same rights and
subject to the same obligations on the same terms.62 Regardless of race, social class,
education, wealth, and beliefs, a citizen is a citizen and must be treated as such under
the law.63 This holds generally true in the United States: formally, citizens have
equal access to rights. More precisely, citizens are entitled to rights on the same
terms. This principle is embedded in the U.S. Constitution and is a hallmark of the
U.S. civic ideal. Among other things, citizens may vote, remain in the United States,
57

For a historical account of the details and failure of compulsory jury service in the
United States, see Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796–
1996, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2673, 2673–75 (1996).
58
See SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., SELECTIVE SERVICE—WHO MUST REGISTER,
https://www.sss.gov/portals/0/PDFs/WhoMustRegisterChart.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6KBRLMU] (last visited May 1, 2016).
59
See id.
60
Rogers Brubaker identified six membership norms of citizenship. William Rogers
Brubaker, Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France and Germany: A
Comparative Historical Analysis, 5 INT’L SOC. 379, 380 (1990). Under his model, citizenship
“should be egalitarian, sacred, national, democratic, unique and socially consequential.” Id.;
see also MARSHALL, supra note 18, at 28–29 (“All who possess the status [of citizenship]
are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed.”).
61
ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 21
(1992); Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 19, at 370 (“On the orthodox view, citizenship is,
by definition, a matter of treating people as individuals with equal rights under the law. This
is what distinguishes democratic citizenship from feudal and other premodern views that
determined people’s political status by their religious, ethnic, or class membership.”); see
also MARSHALL, supra note 18, at 8–10 (discussing the effects of class distinctions on
citizenship and citizens’ participation in society).
62
See Ediberto Román, The Citizenship Dialectic, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 557, 565, 568
(2006) (“Equality among the citizenry is not only a deeply rooted component of citizenship
literature but is also a basis for the citizenship ideal.” (citation omitted)).
63
This principle is sometimes described not as equality of citizenship but as protection
of minorities. That is, equality is preserved specifically by “protecting ‘the few’ who have
little power . . . who need shelter from the tyranny of ‘the many’ and/or elites.” Janoski &
Gran, supra note 31, at 13.
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and access welfare benefits on the same terms without regard to race, culture,
religion, or social class.
This is not to say that all U.S. citizens have unencumbered access to all the
same rights. Scholars have documented the myriad ways in which U.S. citizens who
are members of minority groups experience, as a matter of practical reality, limited
citizenship rights.64 The resulting second-class citizenship is very real and poses a
significant problem to the liberal democratic ideal. But the creation of second-class
citizenship cannot be explicitly embedded into the structure of the state’s
distribution of citizenship rights under well-accepted normative models of
citizenship. Indeed, in the United States, second-class citizenship is not a feature of
citizenship, but largely a by-product of inappropriate and often illegal practices and
cultural biases. For purposes of this Article, I am interested in the state’s express
guarantees of rights rather than de facto experienced rights.
In a few instances, U.S. law does make express distinctions among citizens that
result in some citizens having fewer rights. Equal protection jurisprudence exists
precisely to delineate between constitutional and unconstitutional ways in which the
government may distinguish between individuals.65 The Supreme Court has found
some distinctions between classes of citizens constitutional. For example, the Court
has declined to strike down provisions that make convicted felons ineligible to vote
in elections.66 This might appear to be inconsistent with the “region of legal equality”
of the universally accepted normative model for citizenship. After all, one class of
citizens—convicted felons—has restricted access to one of the rights attached to
citizenship. Indeed, several scholars have criticized this aspect of current U.S. voting
laws.67 But this restriction could also be characterized as a feature of an equal
citizenship regime in that all citizens are subject to this prohibition on the same
64

See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 1113–15; Bartlett, supra note 4, at 1; Johnson,
An Essay on Immigration Politics, supra note 4, at 629–30.
65
For an interesting article exploring the meaning of “similarly situated” in Equal
Protection jurisprudence, see Giovanna Shay, Similarly Situated, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV.
581, 581 (2011); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“There is hardly a law on the books that does not affect some people
differently from others.”); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (“The
constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective. State legislatures are presumed to have
acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in
some inequality.”).
66
See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (upholding felon
disenfranchisement laws).
67
See Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the
Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 405 (2012) (demonstrating the factors
that inhibit convicted felons’ access to voting rights, including “[c]lass and race-based
stigma, collateral consequences, onerous re-enfranchisement requirements, and burgeoning
carceral debt”); Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1048–52
(questioning the liberal and republican justifications for disenfranchisement of convicted
felons).
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terms.68 Importantly for this Article, these prohibitions do not apply differently to
citizens depending on the method they acquired citizenship.
In fact, I am aware of only a few rights or benefits of U.S. citizenship that are
legally restricted based on the method of acquiring citizenship.69 Two important ones
come to mind.70 First, the U.S. Constitution expressly limits eligibility for the
presidency to “natural born citizens.”71 Commentators have not always agreed on
68

This is not to say that I support disenfranchisement of convicted citizens. In fact, I
would argue that denials of citizenship rights to convicted citizens only serves to alienate
and further exclude them in a way that impedes their development of the substantive
citizenship described in this Article. That is, felon disenfranchisement laws arguably do not
adequately account for the prescriptive role of formal citizenship described in Part IV.
69
Arguably, naturalized and birthright citizens could be described as having unequal
access to rights by virtue of the differing evidence requirements each will produce to prove
citizenship status as a prerequisite to exercising citizenship rights. Individuals who are
citizens by virtue of birth in U.S. territory may show a birth certificate to prove citizenship
while others may need to produce a certificate of citizenship or a passport as proof of
citizenship. See Fatma Marouf, The Hunt for Noncitizen Voters, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
66, 66 (2012). Here I also note that there are several examples of states discriminating against
certain U.S.-born citizens. Some states, for example, have denied or continue to deny in-state
resident college tuition rates to U.S. citizens who are the children of undocumented
immigrants. See Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild? College Residency and the
Response to Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REV. 99, 109 (2008) (documenting state efforts
to deny in-state resident college tuition rates to the children of undocumented immigrants,
including those born in the U.S.). Texas has prevented U.S.-born children access to their
birth certificates by imposing burdensome identification requirements—ones that
undocumented immigrants have difficulty meeting—for a parent wishing to obtain the
certificate. See Manny Fernandez, Immigrants Fight Texas’ Birth Certificate Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept.
17,
2015)
(on
file
with
the
Utah
Law
Review),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/us/illegal-immigrant-birth-certificates.html. At first,
this might look like a distinction that is based on a method of acquiring citizenship. After all,
states are discriminating against individuals who obtained citizenship by birth in the U.S.
after their parents entered or remained in the United States without authorization. However,
these distinctions do not distinguish among jus soli, jus sanguinis, and/or naturalization.
They discriminate based on parents’ immigration status. These distinctions are reprehensible
and face strong legal challenges, but they do not represent discrimination based on a method
of acquiring citizenship.
70
Other than the two mentioned in the text, I have encountered only one other
circumstance in which the method of acquiring citizenship creates differing legal rights or
benefits. The tax code normally requires a U.S. citizen residing abroad to pay certain taxes
upon renouncing U.S. citizenship. However, an individual who was born both a U.S. citizen
and the citizen of another country—a birthright dual citizen—may avoid this exit tax. The
effect of this distinction is to require all naturalized U.S. citizens to pay the exit tax upon
expatriation, but require only some birthright citizens to pay that exit tax. See 26 U.S.C. §
877A (g)(1)(B)(i) (2015).
71
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; see Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1964) (“We
start from the premise that the rights of citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized
person are of the same dignity and are coextensive. The only difference drawn by the
Constitution is that only the ‘natural born’ citizen is eligible to be President.”); Knauer v.
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exactly who is included in this term, but there is broad consensus on who it
excludes:72 naturalized citizens are not natural born citizens and therefore cannot be
elected to the presidency.73 Second, naturalized citizens may lose citizenship on
slightly different terms than their birthright citizen counterparts. The U.S.
government may revoke a naturalized citizen’s citizenship that was obtained through
fraud or some other illegal act.74 In essence, such denaturalization rules call into
question the validity of naturalization and the legitimacy of the acquired citizenship.
2. Substantive Citizenship
Citizenship means more than just the state’s guarantee of equal rights. The word
“citizen” conjures notions of belonging, inclusion, and shared identity,75 and
scholars have described a more substantive—or “thick”—conception of
citizenship.76 In addition to its formal dimensions, citizenship has a “membership
United States, 328 U.S. 654, 658 (1946); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673
(1944); Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913); Jill A. Pryor, The Natural-Born Citizen
Clause and Presidential Eligibility: An Approach for Resolving Two Hundred Years of
Uncertainty, 97 YALE L.J. 881, 881 (1988) (“Despite its apparent simplicity, the natural-born
citizen clause of the Constitution has never been completely understood. . . . It is . . . clear
that persons born abroad of alien parents, who later become citizens by naturalization, do not
[qualify].” (citations omitted)); see also Sarah Helene Duggin & Mary Beth Collins, ‘Natural
Born’ in the USA: The Striking Unfairness and Dangerous Ambiguity of the Constitution’s
Presidential Qualifications Clause and Why We Need to Fix It, 85 B.U. L. REV. 53, 54–55
(2005) (discussing the ambiguity of the “natural born Citizen” clause); Christina S. Lohman,
Presidential Eligibility: The Meaning of the Natural-Born Citizen Clause, 36 GONZ. L. REV.
349, 349 (2001) (analyzing the history and disagreements over the meaning of the “natural
born Citizen” provision).
72
See supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also Duggin & Collins, supra note 71,
at 56 n.11 (indicating that “individuals born outside the United States who have no claim to
United States citizenship other than post-birth naturalization . . . are barred from serving as
President or Vice President.”); Lohman, supra note 71, at 360 (stating that under English
common law “any child born to an alien enemy father engaged in hostile occupation of
British territory was not a natural-born British subject . . . [and] any child born to an alien
father who was an ambassador or diplomat of a foreign state was also excluded.” (citation
omitted)).
73
See Schneider, 377 U.S. at 165.
74
See Immigration and Nationality Act § 340(a), (e), (j), 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (2012).
75
D. Carolina Núñez, War of the Words: Aliens, Immigrants, Citizens, and the
Language of Exclusion, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1517, 1518, 1523.
76
See, e.g., Diemut Bubeck, Thin, Thick and Feminist Conception of Citizenship,
CONTEMPORARY POL. STUD. 461, 461–62 (1995) (defining thick citizenship as active
engagement in the community and political life); Charles Tilly, Citizenship, Identity and
Social History, in CITIZENSHIP, IDENTITY AND SOCIAL HISTORY 1, 8 (1996) (“Citizenship can
then range from thin to thick: thin where it entails few transactions, rights and obligations;
thick where it occupies a significant share of all transactions, rights and obligations sustained
by state agents and people living under their jurisdiction.”); Effie MacLachlan, The Graduate
Sch. & Univ. Ctr. of the City of N.Y., Address at the ECSA Sixth Biennial International
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facet”: “the sense of belonging and participation in the national community.”77 This
could take a number of forms, depending on a community’s understanding of
membership in the national community.78 It is in this “thick” conception of
citizenship that a sense of shared identity, loyalty, responsibility, and contribution
come into play.79 When we talk about citizens, we often contemplate this
“substantive citizenship” in addition to the more formal citizenship described above.
Substantive citizenship escapes precise description, both because it is an
abstract concept and because it is country specific. States may have various ways of
conceptualizing substantive citizenship. In some states, it might be strongly tied to
cultural identity and language.80 In other states, it might be linked to political ideals
or religion.81 In the U.S., it may be a basic sense of shared political identity. It is
important to note that this Article does not undertake a detailed description or
normative model of substantive citizenship in the United States or in any other state.
Such inquiries may be found elsewhere.82 This Article’s purpose is to create a

Conference: Who Cares?: Gender and Citizenship in the European Union 3 (June 2–5, 1999),
http://aei.pitt.edu/2324/1/002596_1.PDF [https://perma.cc/86WG-7V3T] (arguing that thick
citizenship indicates active political and community engagement and the extent of
transactions, rights, and obligations).
77
Román, supra note 62, at 572; see Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 19, at 369
(“Citizenship is not just a certain status, defined by a set of rights and responsibilities. It is
also an identity, an expression of one’s membership in a political community.”); see also
DEREK HEATER, CITIZENSHIP: THE CIVIC IDEAL IN WORLD HISTORY, POLITICS AND
EDUCATION 187 (3d ed. 2004) (“Citizenship is more than a label. He who has no sense of a
civic bond with his fellows or of some responsibility for civic welfare is not a true citizen
whatever his legal status. Identity and virtue invest the concept of citizenship with power.”).
78
See HEATER, supra note 77, at 187 (“The interests which unite a group are often
cultural—a sense of tradition, ethnicity or way of life.”); WALZER, supra note 7, at 52
(arguing that current members have a right to decide the criteria for admission to
membership).
79
Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 19, at 353; William Safran, Citizenship and
Nationality in Democratic Systems: Approaches to Defining and Acquiring Membership in
the Political Community, 18 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 313, 313 (1997) (“In a more general sense,
[citizenship] also refers to a person’s moral quality as exemplified by his or her
behavior . . . .”).
80
JAMES P. LYNCH & RITA J. SIMON, IMMIGRATION THE WORLD OVER: STATUTES,
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 213–15 (2003).
81
Some commentators, for example, have characterized U.S. citizenship (or, more
specifically for purposes of this paper, substantive citizenship) with reference to political
ideals. See, e.g., Safran, supra note 79, at 318 (“‘Americanness’ was defined in terms of a
commitment to democracy, equality, and other values, as anchored in the U.S.
Constitution . . . .”).
82
See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 7, at 52 (discussing the meaning of membership in
political communities and the differences between immigration and naturalization); Bosniak,
supra note 35, at 449 (questioning whether citizenship as a concept can only ever be
national); Linda Bosniak, Varieties of Citizenship, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449, 2449 (2007)
(discussing the concept of national citizenship in the alienage setting); Matthew Lister,

494

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

framework that applies to many different conceptions of substantive citizenship and
many different types of citizenship rules. Here, I analyze the ways in which formal
citizenship may relate to substantive citizenship, whatever its content and contours,
particularly in a system of coexisting citizenship rules.
Regardless of the precise contours of the state’s substantive citizenship, the
assumption is that citizens share or ought to share some fundamental quality or
identity that affects
how they view potentially competing forms of national, regional, ethnic,
or religious identities; their ability to tolerate and work together with
others who are different from themselves; their desire to participate in the
political process in order to promote the public good and hold political
authorities accountable; their willingness to show self-restraint and
exercise personal responsibility in their economic demands and in
personal choices which affect their health and environment.83
In sum, substantive citizenship is a sense of belonging and shared identity that binds
individual members of the state together. Whether that sense of belonging is based
solely on a shared commitment to a democratic ideal, a strong sense of shared
history, or an attachment to a shared territory, substantive citizenship ideally gives
shape to the collective citizenry.
B. U.S. Citizenship Law: Unequal Paths to Equal Rights?
Though citizens exercise equal rights and—at least ideally—share a sense of
belonging and membership, they do not obtain citizenship in the same way. To the
contrary, states employ a variety of rules to distinguish citizens from noncitizens. In
fact, multiple paths to citizenship, each with very different requirements, may
coexist within a single state. In virtually all states, birthright citizenship rules have
naturalization counterparts. Such is the case in the United States. Some are citizens
by virtue of birth within U.S. territory84 or birth to U.S. citizen parents,85 and others
become citizens after fulfilling naturalization requirements.86 Though all these paths
rely on different criteria, they confer the very same citizenship and the very same
rights on those who satisfy their criteria.

Citizenship, in the Immigration Context, 70 MD. L. REV. 175, 175 (2010) (investigating what
substantive citizenship means in the context of children).
83
Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 19, at 352–53.
84
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
85
See I.N.A. §§ 301, 309, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2012).
86
See I.N.A. § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1423.
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1. U.S. Citizenship Law: A Triad
U.S. citizenship law provides three main avenues for the acquisition of
citizenship: birthright citizenship based on birth in the United States, naturalization,
and birthright citizenship based on birth to a U.S. citizen parent.
(a) Territorial Birthright Citizenship
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[a]ll persons born . . . in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .”87
Some commentators have suggested that the requirement that an individual be
“subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States at birth imposes additional
requirements besides mere birth within the territory.88 But these arguments have not
gained traction; the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause has been interpreted
to require the bestowal of citizenship on every individual born within United States
territory.89 The rule is strictly territorial in nature. Thus under even a single rule, the
U.S. version of jus soli—territorial birthright citizenship—a wide spectrum of
individuals become citizens of the United States.
(b) Naturalization
The Constitution also contemplates a path to citizenship after birth, and Article
I specifically assigns the power to regulate naturalization to Congress.90 The
Immigration and Nationality Act details the requirements.91 Broadly speaking,92 an
individual may apply for naturalization by showing that he has resided in the United
States for five years, has been physically present in the United States for two and a
half years, is of good moral character, is attached to the principles of the
Constitution, has basic proficiency in the English language, and has a basic

87

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See, e.g., SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 116–19.
89
Supreme Court dicta supports this view. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S.
649, 699, 705 (1898) (holding that a child born in the United States to Chinese nationals,
who were ineligible to naturalize, was a U.S. citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment). Two
universally accepted exceptions to the Fourteenth Amendment’s territorial birthright
citizenship clause exist—neither the children of enemy aliens nor the children of diplomats
are U.S. citizens despite being born on U.S. soil. See Garrett Epps, The Citizenship Clause:
A “Legislative History,” 60 AM. U. L. REV. 331, 338 n.30 (2010).
90
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
91
See I.N.A. § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1423.
92
Some of the requirements of naturalization vary in certain instances. For example,
spouses of U.S. citizens have a shorter residency requirement than others, and long-term
residents may apply for naturalization without fulfilling the language, history, and civics
requirement after reaching a certain age. See I.N.A. § 316, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1422–23, 1430.
88
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understanding of U.S. history and civics.93 If approved, the process culminates in a
citizenship ceremony where the applicant takes an oath of allegiance to the United
States.94
(c) Birthright Citizenship Based on Parent’s Citizenship
Rules granting citizenship to infants born outside of the United States to U.S.
citizen parents form the third leg of the U.S. citizenship law triad. These rules allow
for children to essentially inherit the citizenship of their parents. Though these rules
can broadly be characterized as jus sanguinis, they do not rely entirely on the
citizenship of the parent. Current citizenship rules provide for U.S. citizenship to
foreign-born children of U.S. citizens only where the U.S. citizen parent has resided
in or been physically present in the United States prior to the birth of the child.95 The
length of residence or physical presence required varies depending on whether the
child is born in wedlock and on whether the U.S. citizen parent is the child’s mother
or father. A child born out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen mother, for example, is a
U.S. citizen if the mother was physically present in the United States for at least one
year prior to the birth of the child.96 A child born to a married U.S. citizen father and
noncitizen mother is a U.S. citizen only if the father has been physically present in
the United States for at least five years, two of which were after the age of fifteen.97
A child born to two U.S. citizen parents is a U.S. citizen if at least one of the parents
had a residence of any length in the U.S. prior to the birth of the child.98
93

See I.N.A. § 316, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1422–23, 1427.
See I.N.A. § 337, 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (requiring a naturalization applicant to take a public
oath of allegiance).
95
See I.N.A. § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401.
96
See I.N.A. § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401.
97
See I.N.A. § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401. An unwed U.S. citizen father must also satisfy a
series of requirements that are inapplicable to mothers wishing to pass on citizenship to their
children. Unwed fathers must establish a blood relationship with the child; agree, in writing,
to financially support the child until age eighteen; and establish parentage in court, either
through legitimation, a written and sworn acknowledgment of paternity, or court
adjudication. I.N.A. § 309, 8 U.SC. §1409. The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of the more burdensome requirements for fathers wishing to pass on U.S.
citizenship to their children born out of wedlock, citing a legitimate interest in a
“demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop not just a relationship that is recognized,
as a formal matter, by the law, but one that consists of the real, everyday ties that provide a
connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.” Nguyen v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 64–65 (2001).
98
U.S. law also provides a mechanism for noncitizen children to automatically become
U.S. citizens under certain conditions. Noncitizen children who reside in the United States
as legal permanent residents with at least one U.S. citizen parent automatically become U.S.
citizens. See I.N.A. § 320, 8 U.S.C. § 1431. Noncitizen children who are temporarily
admitted to the United States may apply for a certificate of citizenship if a U.S. citizen parent
or grandparent has met certain U.S. residency requirements. See I.N.A. § 322, 8 U.S.C. §
1433. These rules affect children in many different situations. Under these rules, a child may
94
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2. The Citizenship Paradox
“Laws of citizenship and immigration do more than regulate the entry and the
status of non-citizens; they reveal much about how a nation conceives of itself.”99
What, then, do U.S. citizenship rules tell us about how the United States conceives
of itself? The variety of paths to citizenship results in a wide spectrum of citizens.
Consider the following examples:
A is a two-day-old infant born in Ohio. Her parents are French immigrants
living lawfully and permanently in the United States. Because A was born
in the United States, she is a U.S. citizen.
B is a Vietnamese schoolteacher. When he became eligible for
naturalization a few years ago, he applied. As part of the naturalization
process, B had to demonstrate basic English proficiency, knowledge of
U.S. history and civics, and five years of residence in the United States,
among other things. Because he successfully completed the naturalization
process, B acquired U.S. citizenship.
C is a five-year-old child living in Argentina. She was born in Argentina
a year after her parents—both of them U.S. citizens—moved there to work
at the foreign branch of a U.S.-based company. Because C’s parents are
U.S. citizens who had a residence in the United States prior to C’s birth, C
acquired U.S. citizenship at birth.
While the existence of multiple methods of acquiring the same right is
interesting in and of itself, it is not unique. Other areas of law employ a similar
structure. Individuals may acquire the “bundle of rights” associated with real
property ownership, for instance, by formal transfer of title or through adverse

automatically become a U.S. citizen upon a parent’s naturalization. In addition, an adopted
child who entered as a legal permanent resident automatically becomes a citizen upon
establishing a residence in the United States with an adoptive U.S. citizen parent. These rules
draw from U.S. jus soli and jus sanguinis rules in that they look to parentage and territorial
presence in the United States. However, they confer citizenship after birth and therefore act
much like categorical naturalization rules. Because these mechanisms depend on or mirror
one of the three main forms of citizenship acquisition discussed in this Article, I do not
discuss them separately.
99
Daniel Kanstroom, Wer Sind Wir Wieder? Laws of Asylum, Immigration, and
Citizenship in the Struggle for the Soul of the New Germany, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 155, 158
(1993) (citation omitted).
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possession.100 In many legal regimes, including a handful of U.S. states,101 the law
recognizes a couple as married if an individual authorized by the state marries them
through a process outlined by the law or if they openly cohabitate for a certain
number of years as spouses.102
While many might object to some of these alternative methods of acquiring
property rights and/or marriage rights, it is reasonably easy to articulate a common
theme that runs through each system of disparate rules. Property law, the argument
might go, ought to incentivize and protect individuals’ improvement of land in a way
that maximizes its utility.103 By recognizing the ownership of an individual who paid
money or other consideration for land, the law protects and coincides with that
individual’s vested interest in maximizing the benefit of that land.104 Likewise, an
individual who has been in possession of the land has a vested interest in its utility

100

See 3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse Possession § 1 (2013) (explaining that individuals may
acquire the bundle of rights through adverse possession); 72 AM. JUR. 2D Statute of Frauds
§ 60 (2012) (explaining that individuals may acquire the bundle of rights through the statute
of frauds).
101
Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Texas, and the District of Columbia still recognized common-law marriage as of
2012. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2502 (Supp. 2014); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-1-100 (2006); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (West 2006); Creel v. Creel,
763 So. 2d 943, 946 (Ala. 2000); Johnson v. Young, 372 A.2d 992, 994 (D.C. 1977); In re
Marriage of Martin, 681 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Iowa 2004); In re Estate of Ober, 62 P.3d 1114,
1115 (Mont. 2003); In re Estate of Stinchcomb, 674 P.2d 26, 28–29 (Okla. 1983) (per
curiam); DeMelo v. Zompa, 844 A.2d 174, 177–78 (R.I. 2004) (per curiam). New Hampshire
recognizes common-law marriage only at death. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (2006).
Utah recognized common-law marriage by statute in 1987 in an effort to combat welfare
fraud. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (West 2013).
102
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (stating that couples are legally and validly
married if a court or administrative agency establishes a marriage based on ceremony or
cohabitation).
103
See Carol Necole Brown & Serena M. Williams, Rethinking Adverse Possession:
An Essay on Ownership and Possession, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 583, 584–85 (2010)
(describing various normative rationales for adverse possession as consistent with an overall
goal of efficiency and fairness); John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse
Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 840–42 (1994) (describing and ultimately critiquing
the “development model” of adverse possession: “Under the development model, adverse
possession functions to facilitate the economic exploitation of land.”); see also ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 156 (1988) (noting that adverse possession
tends to redistribute property to higher-valued uses); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 70 (3d ed. 1986) (explaining that a property has more utility if the adverse
possessor keeps the property); Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 55, 61–62 (1987) (arguing that in the context of boundary disputes,
particularly in urban areas, the adverse possessor places a higher value on the disputed land
than does the record owner).
104
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 847–49 (2009).
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and therefore is likely to improve it to maximize utility.105 Similar reasoning might
be applied in the context of marriage. If marriage helps further individual family
members’ economic and social well-being,106 then that purpose can be achieved by
allowing individuals to claim legal protections afforded by marriage in a formal legal
ceremony or by bestowing those rights on individuals already living such an
arrangement.
Citizenship rules operate in much the same way, but their commonality is much
harder to discern than that of property acquisition and marriage rules. The
hypothetical U.S. citizens above help illustrate this point. Two things are worth
noting about them. First, it is difficult to identify a commonality among these
individuals that would suggest they are equally qualified for citizenship. Though B,
the Vietnamese schoolteacher, was required to demonstrate basic English
proficiency and knowledge of U.S. history and civics, A, the Ohio-born baby, cannot
speak at all and knows nothing of history and civics. In fact, there is no guarantee
that A would ever be able to meet the same requirements that B met in order to be
naturalized. The only thing that A and B seem to share, aside from their citizenship,
is their residence in the United States. But they do not share this with C, who lives
in Argentina. And there is no guarantee that C will ever set foot in the United States.
All three individuals, however, are entitled to the same citizenship despite qualifying
under different rules.
A second observation worth noting is that none of these hypotheticals is
particularly controversial in the political realm. Few legislators or politicians would
raise objections to any of these individuals acquiring citizenship or call into question
the legitimacy of their citizenship. This is important. It helps illustrate the
paradoxical nature of the rules. I have crafted these hypotheticals such that the
individuals are sufficiently different to show that U.S. citizenship rules make
citizens of very different individuals. But these hypothetical individuals are unlikely
to trigger a visceral reaction against their citizenship. How can each of these
individuals be legitimately entitled to citizenship despite their very different
qualifications?107
105

For an argument that the uncertainty of adverse possession prior to actual settlement
of title results in less efficiency and social utility, see generally Brown & Williams, supra
note 103, at 583–88 (stating that adverse possession should be abrogated as a way of
divesting owners of title because adverse possession is not the most fair and efficient
outcome). For an argument that the utilitarian underpinnings of the adverse possession
doctrine are not consistent with the modern need to protect the environment, see generally
Sprankling, supra note 103, at 817 (exploring the relationship between adverse possession
and environmental preservation).
106
See Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 1625, 1637–38 (2007); Maggie Gallagher, What Is Marriage For? The Public Purposes
of Marriage Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 773, 781–82 (2002).
107
There are a number of other hypotheticals I could raise to illustrate the point that
U.S. law distributes citizenship to a broad spectrum of individuals. In fact, the asymmetry
between disparate citizenship rules becomes more pronounced if we consider other examples
more likely to elicit controversy. Consider the following:
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If we assume that U.S. citizenship rules do or should conform to intuitive
principles of membership and Walzerian notions of distributive justice, 108 then the
rules by which a state confers citizenship should somehow correspond to the essence
of citizenship. More specifically, if citizenship confers the same rights and
obligations on all citizens equally, we would expect citizenship rules to identify
individuals who are equally desirable for citizenship. But the relationship between
citizenship rules and the rights and obligations attached to citizenship is not obvious.
Neither is the relationship between citizenship rules and the more substantive notion
of belonging inherent in substantive citizenship obvious. What kinds of individuals
are good candidates for citizenship, and do the state’s citizenship rules adequately
identify them? Do the requirements of naturalization guarantee an individual’s sense
of shared identity with other citizens? How does birth within national territory
qualify infants for the same citizenship that naturalized citizens receive?

1. D is a thirty-five-year-old software engineer who was born in the United States
while her mother, an Italian citizen, was on vacation in Florida. Six weeks later,
D traveled to Italy with her mother. D has never returned to the United States.
Because D was born in the United States, he is a U.S. citizen.
2. E is a child living in Afghanistan. He was born in Afghanistan to an unwed
U.S. citizen mother. E’s mother has never been in the United States except for a
year she spent studying English there. Because E’s mother is a U.S. citizen who
spent at least one year in the United States, E is a U.S. citizen. This remains the
case even if E’s mother acquired citizenship in the same way E did.
3. F is a wealthy business owner. For the last five years, F has been spending half
the year in his native Sweden and half the year in his vacation home in Maine. To
eliminate the need for renewing permanent visas and to gain advantage under
Swedish and U.S. tax laws, F naturalized. As a result, F is a U.S. citizen. F
continues to split his time between the United States and Sweden.
These hypotheticals certainly highlight the variety of individuals that U.S. citizenship
rules designate citizens. But they do not highlight the paradox of equal citizenship on unequal
terms because they raise questions of legitimacy from some groups. That is, from some
viewpoints, the paradox would simply be a result of bad rules that need to be fixed. I prefer
to focus on hypotheticals that do not trigger calls for change in order to make some sense out
of the current system. However, I believe that what we learn from these less controversial
examples will help give structure to discussions about the more controversial examples.
108
Interestingly, Walzer argues that all individuals within a state’s territory must have
access to citizenship. For Walzer, rules of immigration serve as the sorting mechanisms for
political membership. Thus, the notion of political membership is tied, in the first instance,
to immigration regulation: “The members of a political community have a collective right to
shape the resident population—a right subject always to . . . the meaning of membership to
the current members and the principle of mutual aid.” WALZER, supra note 7, at 52.
“Immigration, then, is both a matter of political choice and moral constraint. Naturalization,
by contrast, is entirely constrained: every new immigrant, every refugee taken in, every
resident and worker must be offered the opportunities of citizenship.” Id. at 62.
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3. The Citizenship Paradox and Modern Citizenship Scholarship
I believe that much academic commentary on citizenship results from the
tensions inherent in the notion of unequal citizenship rules leading to equal
citizenship. The literature on child citizenship, for example, attempts to reconcile
children’s formal citizenship—usually acquired under birthright citizenship rules—
with their temporarily diminished capacities.109 Many of the rights exclusive to
citizenship are inaccessible to children. Children are legally ineligible to vote, serve
on juries, or run for public office. Few argue that these rights should be available to
children,110 and some have argued that children cannot be accurately described as
citizens at all.111 But some have affirmed children’s citizenship and criticized the
assumption that children are “citizens in the making”112 rather than full citizens.113
These commentators call for expanded rights for children. Some, for example, have
explored children’s diminished citizenship rights in the immigration arena. While
adult citizens may initiate the immigration process for relatives, child citizens may
not.114 More concerning for these commentators is the de facto deportation of citizen
children.115 Broadly speaking, the scholarship on citizen children highlights the
reality that not all citizens are identically qualified to exercise citizenship rights and
obligations despite being citizens.
Likewise, critiques of birthright citizenship are inherently rooted in the paradox
of equal citizenship (and the resulting rights of citizenship) distributed on unequal
109

TOM COCKBURN, RETHINKING CHILDREN’S CITIZENSHIP 1 (2013) (“Perhaps,
‘children’s citizenship’ is a misnomer, as children are in some respects ‘not citizens’: they
have not ‘come of age’ and consequently do not have many of the privileges (such as full
voting rights) or the obligations (such as full financial responsibility) that adults hold.”).
110
Roche, supra note 14, at 487 (“Save for the ‘child liberationists’, no one is arguing
that children are identical to adults or that they should enjoy exactly the same bundle of civil
and political rights as adults.” (citation omitted)); see also Cohen, supra note 15, at 221
(arguing for a reconceptualization of children’s citizenship to more adequately reflect their
diminished capacities and protect important rights). But see Planned Parenthood of Cent.
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into
being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”).
111
John Locke, for example, argued that a government based on consent could not
bestow citizenship on children. Children, he claimed, are not born into the compact. Under
this view, children may not develop a national identity until adulthood. JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 300–01 (Division of Gryphon ed., The Legal Classics Library
1994) (1690).
112
See Lister, supra note 14, at 696 (quoting MARSHALL, supra note 18, at 25).
113
Bhabha, supra note 14, at 56 (“There seems to be an assumption that children’s
disabilities as citizens are self-evidently justified, a consequence of the fact that they are
citizens in the making, ‘future’ rather than actual citizens.”).
114
Id. (describing children’s diminished ability to petition for noncitizen relatives).
115
Id. at 54 (describing circumstances under which citizen children are constructively
deported from the state due to a parent’s deportability).
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terms. Some commentators, for instance, have claimed that citizenship based on
birth within the state’s territory makes an arbitrary and unjust distinction between
individuals who are equally desirable as members of the polity, but were born on
different sides of the border.116 Some question whether birth within the national
territory, by itself, is sufficiently related to the rights and responsibilities of
citizenship to justify the bestowal of citizenship. Thus, under these arguments,
birthright citizenship based on birth within U.S. territory is, at worst, a tool of
exclusion that disenfranchises underprivileged groups117 or, at best, a relic of history
that rewards the lucky and incentivizes unauthorized immigration.118 Scholars have
proposed solutions that range from requiring individuals born in the United States
to confirm citizenship as adults through a process resembling naturalization119 to
limiting birthright citizenship to those born to U.S. citizen parents.120 Underlying
these solutions is a desire to mitigate the effect of a single citizenship rule that
appears to sometimes result in citizenship for an individual who is not similar
enough to those who obtain citizenship through other citizenship rules.
Even broader, more abstract, discussions of citizenship tend to focus on
particular facets of citizenship. Scholars, for instance, have explored citizenship as
116

See generally Shachar, supra note 7, at 369 (arguing that birthright citizenship is an
unjust system of inherited property insufficiently tied to a principled notion of political
membership); Angela Kim, Recent Development, Development in the Legislative Branch:
The Growing Movement to Redefine Birthright Citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment,
25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 757, 757 (2011) (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment’s
establishment of birthright citizenship); William M. Stevens, Comment, Jurisdiction,
Allegiance, and Consent: Revisiting the Forgotten Prong of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Birthright Citizenship Clause in Light of Terrorism, Unprecedented Modern Population
Migrations, Globalization, and Conflicting Cultures, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 337, 389
(2008) (suggesting that the birthright citizenship clause be modified to apply to only children
of citizens or permanent residents).
117
See SHKLAR, supra note 21, at 3.
118
SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 9–10; Charles Wood, Losing Control of
America’s Future—The Census, Birthright Citizenship, and Illegal Aliens, 22 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 465, 497 (1999); Stevens, supra note 116, at 349.
119
See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 117; see also Joy Pepi Wiesenfeld, Note,
The Conditional Nature of Derivative Citizenship, 8 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 345, 357–58 (1975)
(recommending the requirement of an oath of allegiance to the United States upon the age of
majority for children wishing to keep citizenship inherited from U.S. citizen parents).
120
See, e.g., Kim, supra note 116, at 757; Stevens, supra note 116, at 383–84; see also
Birthright Citizenship Act of 2013, H.R. 140, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013) (proposing to amend
section 301 of the Immigration and Nationality Act to clarify who qualifies for birthright
citizenship); Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011, S. 723, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (same);
Birthright Citizenship Act of 2009, H.R. 1868, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (same); H.R. 126,
111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (proposing to amend section 301 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act by limiting birthright citizenship to persons with a legal resident mother); Citizenship
Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 133, 110th Cong. §§ 2, 3 (2007) (proposing to amend section 301
of the Immigration and Nationality Act by “denying citizenship at birth for children of noncitizen, non-permanent resident aliens”).
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rights,121 citizenship as participation,122 citizenship as work,123 citizenship as
standing,124 and citizenship as identity.125 Each of these illuminates an important
121

MARSHALL, supra note 18, at 8–9; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of
Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471, 1484-88 (1986); Bosniak, supra note 35, at 463-70
(addressing citizenship as rights and stating that “[i]n twentieth-century social theory, the
notion of citizenship has been most closely associated with the enjoyment of certain
important rights and entitlements”).
122
See Bosniak, supra note 35, at 470-79 (addressing citizenship as political activity
and stating that “[a]s political theorists use the term, ‘citizenship’ most commonly denotes
active engagement in the life of the political community”); Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword:
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1977) (arguing
that, to the ancient Greeks, “[t]o be a citizen is not merely to be a consumer of rights, but to
be responsible to other members of the community”); Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 19,
at 353 (describing one meaning of citizenship as “citizenship-as-desirable-activity, where the
extent and quality of one’s citizenship is a function of one’s participation in that
community”); Malinda L. Seymore, The Presidency and the Meaning of Citizenship, 2005
BYU L. REV. 927, 965-69 (2005) (exploring the link between citizenship and political
participation).
123
See, e.g., Linda Bosniak, Citizenship and Work, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
497, 501 (2002); James W. Fox, Jr., Liberalism, Democratic Citizenship, and Welfare
Reform: The Troubling Case of Workfare, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 103, 105 (1996) (stating that
supporters of ‘workfare’ reforms believe that ‘workfare’ aid recipients “will attain equal
social citizenship by performing the primary obligation of citizenship: work.”); Gordon &
Lenhardt, supra note 20, at 1161. See generally LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND
ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, at ix (1986) (suggesting that the
pervasiveness of welfare problems can be solved through citizen work requirements).
124
See, e.g., SHKLAR, supra note 21, at 2; Sofya Aptekar, Citizenship Status and
Patterns of Inequality in the United States and Canada, 95 SOC. SCI. Q. 343, 356–57 (2013)
(“Persistent and large inequalities in citizenship leave the already disadvantaged unskilled
immigrants without access to rights, representation, security, or job and educational
opportunities.”); Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L.
REV. 373, 412–16 (2004); Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement
for U.S. Citizenship, 87 IND. L.J. 1571, 1574 (2012) (arguing that the current enforcement of
this naturalization requirement “force[s] legal resident immigrants with criminal histories to
permanently live in the shadows of full citizenship, never able to possess the . . . respect that
citizenship can bring.”); Michael T. Light et al., Citizenship and Punishment: The Salience
of National Membership in U.S. Criminal Courts, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 825, 825 (2014)
(“[C]itizenship status is a salient predictor of sentencing outcomes [in criminal
prosecutions]—more powerful than race or ethnicity.”); Eileen Díaz McConnell, Hurdles or
Walls? Nativity, Citizenship, Legal Status and Latino Homeownership in Los Angeles, 53
SOC. SCI. RES. 19, 21 (2015) (“Many studies report that citizen immigrants have higher
homeownership rates than non-citizen immigrants.”); Scott E. Wolfe et al., Unraveling the
Effect of Offender Citizenship Status on Federal Sentencing Outcomes, 40 SOC. SCI. RES.
349, 349 (2010) (“[B]oth legal and illegal aliens have a higher probability of incarceration
than similarly-situated US citizens.”).
125
See RUTH LISTER, CITIZENSHIP: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 3 (2d ed. 2003) (“The
notion of citizenship identity derives from the most basic meaning of citizenship:
membership of a community . . . .”); Bosniak, supra note 35, at 479-88 (addressing
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dimension of membership in the polity, but treats each without sufficient reference
to the others and therefore fails to account for the relationships among them,
especially the relationship between substantive and formal dimensions. This is
perhaps due, at least in part, to the difficulty of explaining why formal citizenship
rules do not always coincide with many of these facets of citizenship. Citizenship
rules, after all, do not necessarily distribute formal citizenship to individuals who
base their identity on that citizenship or who participate in the polity, and noncitizens
may be just as likely to identify with a state or participate in the polity as their citizen
counterparts.
While some citizenship inquiries have seemingly orbited around the paradox
without touching down on it,126 no one has offered an explanation or resolution of
that paradox.
4. Addressing the Citizenship Paradox
Broadly speaking, there are two alternative ways of addressing the apparent
paradox of equal citizenship distributed on unequal terms. First, one might simply
attribute the existence of dissonant citizenship rules to meaningless accidents of
history. Under this view, one might conclude that existing U.S. citizenship rules are
arbitrary and unjust. Second, one might instead view the existence of disparate
citizenship rules as somehow meaningful in itself. Under this view, one might distill
some insight about citizenship from an analysis of the system as a whole.
In this Article I take the second approach. Part IV below proposes a framework
for understanding citizenship that resolves the apparent paradox described in this
Part. In that sense, this Article advances the notion that there is a legitimate rationale
for the apparent paradoxical distribution of citizenship and that individual
citizenship rules are integral pieces of a cohesive system. Individual citizenship rules
citizenship as identity/solidarity and discussing “citizenship’s psychological dimension, that
part of citizenship that describes the affective ties of identification and solidarity that we
maintain with groups of other people in the world.” (citation omitted)); Helen Elizabeth
Hartnell, Belonging: Citizenship and Migration in the European Union and in Germany, 24
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 330, 345 (2006); Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 19, at 353; Seymore,
supra note 122, at 958-64 (exploring naturalized citizenship as identity); Nora Graham,
Note, Patriot Act II and Denationalization: An Unconstitutional Attempt to Revive Stripping
Americans of Their Citizenship, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 593, 618 (2004-05) (discussing the
consequences of losing citizenship when “the [Supreme] Court considers citizenship to be
the equivalent to a person’s social and political identity” (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958))).
126
Noah M.J. Pickus, To Make Natural: Creating Citizens for the Twenty-First
Century, in IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 107, 123 (Noah
M.J. Pickus ed., 1998) (evaluating U.S. naturalization law’s capacity to create a common
national identity and asking: “Why, simply because they were born in the United States,
should legal residents be entitled to the rights of citizenship, especially participation in
governance? In particular, why should alienated residents, citizens who know little and care
less about the polity, be entitled to citizenship, while committed and knowledgeable aliens
are denied it?”).
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have admittedly arisen at different times and for different reasons in a way that might
seem to weigh against studying them together as a whole. However, those individual
rules have enjoyed significant longevity—the U.S., for example, has included some
version of jus soli, jus sanguinis, and naturalization since its founding. As a result,
citizenship rules have had ample time to yield to a public sense of a just distribution
of citizenship. Citizenship rules, in other words, provide some evidence of what U.S.
citizens, through their representatives, have believed to be an appropriate and just
way to distribute citizenship.
In any event, even if citizenship rules do not reflect any coherent understanding
of citizenship or just distribution—if they are truly accidents of history—the
discussion that follows in Part IV can be read as a framework for discussing the
potential functions of citizenship and evaluating the current U.S. citizenship system.
That is to say, the discussion in Part IV need not depend on the assumption that
citizenship rules have developed, in the first instance, around the framework
proposed below.
IV. THE CITIZENSHIP MAP
The apparent paradox created by varying citizenship rules results from an
incomplete understanding of citizenship. Discussions about citizenship build on two
related but flawed premises. First, some scholars have failed to sufficiently
distinguish between substantive and formal citizenship and have assumed that
formal citizenship does or should coincide with substantive citizenship.127 At first
glance, this seems like a reasonable position. In the complete absence of substantive
citizenship, formal citizenship becomes a meaningless entitlement to shared rights
despite a lack of shared identity or sense of membership. However, the reality is that
many citizenship rules, in the United States and elsewhere, do not require a
concurrence of formal and substantive citizenship.
U.S. citizenship law diverges significantly from coinciding formal and
substantive citizenship. U.S. citizenship law does not ensure that formal citizens are
also substantive citizens (i.e., individuals who have developed substantive
citizenship). After all, it is untenable to say that the Ohio-born and Argentina-born
children of my hypotheticals above exhibit some quality—like loyalty or a sense of
shared culture—with other citizens from the moment of birth. It is also unlikely that
naturalization ensures that naturalized citizens have acquired all the requisite
fundamental qualities of substantive citizenship. This is especially the case in states
that, like the United States, impose a relatively small burden on naturalization
applicants. But I do not believe this is a failure of U.S. citizenship law. Rather, it is
a potential strength. Citizenship rules should not exclusively aim to make formal
citizens of those that are already substantive citizens. A rigid coupling of formal and
substantive citizenship fails to account for the transformative power of citizenship.
Formal citizenship can facilitate and promote substantive citizenship, as I will
explain below in section IV.B.
127

See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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The second flawed premise of many citizenship discussions relates to and
depends on the first. Because scholars often focus on the rights of citizenship—
citizenship as the final rung on an ascending ladder of rights128—citizenship
sometimes appears to be a static condition or the culmination of substantive
citizenship. Public rhetoric often echoes this notion. Politicians speak of a “path to
citizenship”129 in a way that suggests citizenship is a final destination. This has
intuitive appeal. After all, citizens enjoy the full package of rights and benefits
offered by the state; there is no category of persons with more rights and benefits.130
128

See, e.g., Bosniak, supra note 35, at 450–51 (“Virtually everyone in the debates
treats citizenship as embodying the highest normative value. The term rings unmistakably
with the promise of personal engagement, community well-being, and democratic
fulfillment.” (citation omitted)); Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The DREAM Act,
Immigration Reform and Citizenship, 14 NEV. L.J. 101, 122 (2013) (“[T]he DREAMers have
also had to contend with the fact that there is no existing path to help them realize their goal
of matching their identity as Americans to a legal status as U.S. citizens. The absolute lack
of a path to regularize their immigration status means that, for DREAMers, there is no
possibility (yet) for transitioning to the ultimate, full membership of citizenship . . . .”); Juliet
Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 367, 398 (2006) (“Immigration law defines membership in this society explicitly, by
establishing a ladder of accession to permanent residence and then formal U.S. citizenship,
and a set of criteria to determine whether an individual meets the requirements for these
various levels of membership.”).
129
See, e.g., Josh Hicks, Sen. Ted Cruz Calls Path to Citizenship ‘Profoundly Unfair,’
WASH. POST (July 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2013/
07/21/sen-ted-cruz-calls-path-to-citizenship-profoundly-unfair/
[https://perma.cc/RTR65KY3] (quoting Senator Ted Cruz as saying, “I think a path to citizenship for those who are
here illegally is profoundly unfair to the millions of legal immigrants who followed the
rules . . . .”); Annie Karni, Bill Clinton: Path to Citizenship Is Just Common Sense,
POLITICO (May 12, 2015, 1:01 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/bill-clintonimmigration-citizenship-path-117856.html [https://perma.cc/3RN8-H5C6] (quoting former
President Bill Clinton as saying, “I think the only thing that makes sense is a path to
citizenship and adequate support for children . . . .”); Seth McLaughlin, Jeb Bush’s
Immigration Evolution: Earned Legal Status but No Path to Citizenship, WASH. TIMES (July
8, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/8/jeb-bush-no-illegal-immigrantpath-to-citizenship-/?page=all [https://perma.cc/K6N4-5UYP] (quoting former Secretary of
State Hillary Rodham Clinton as saying, “[Jeb Bush] doesn’t believe in a path to citizenship.
If he did at one time, he no longer does . . . .”); Charlie Spiering, Chris Christie: No ‘Special
Way’ for Illegal Immigrants to Get U.S. Citizenship, BREITBART (July 20, 2015),
http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/07/20/chris-christie-no-special-way-forillegal-immigrants-to-get-u-s-citizenship/ [https://perma.cc/KB5K-DLKP] (quoting New
Jersey Governor Chris Christie as saying, “I think, you know, Secretary Clinton talks about
[a] path to citizenship for people who are here illegally—she’s just pandering . . . . ”); Earned
Citizenship, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/immigration/
earned-citizenship [https://perma.cc/5ZQK-S35D] (quoting President Barack Obama as
saying that “[w]e’ve got to lay out a path [to citizenship for individuals who are here
illegally] . . . .”).
130
Lowell W. Barrington, The Making of Citizenship Policy in the Baltic States, 13
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 159, 161 (1999) (“[C]itizenship is . . . the highest form of official
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Moreover, immigration rules can be viewed as a transitional mechanism that leads
individuals to the ultimate goal of citizenship.131 Here, I propose that formal
citizenship continues the transition. A static view of citizenship ignores the reality
that formal citizenship does not necessarily equate with substantive citizenship.
Formal citizens have varying levels of substantive citizenship at the time they
acquire citizenship, formal citizens can develop substantive citizenship after
obtaining formal citizenship, and formal citizenship can affect individuals’
substantive citizenship in a variety of ways.
A. The Citizenship Trajectory
Formal citizenship is best understood not as a static condition that equates with
substantive citizenship but rather as a trajectory that leads toward that ideal. In other
words, formal citizenship may lead to, facilitate, and preserve a more substantive
citizenship. Formal citizenship might be visualized as a one-way highway with
multiple entrances that leads toward substantive citizenship. In this analogy,
substantive citizenship is the destination, formal citizenship is the path of travel, and
citizenship rules provide access.132
This imagery aptly illustrates four important points. First, in the same way that
a single highway can have multiple entrance ramps, the citizenship path has multiple
entry points. Though individuals on the citizenship path may travel in the same
direction—toward substantive citizenship—they have accessed the trajectory via
different citizenship rules. Some have entered the path through birth in the territory,
others by naturalization, and still others through birth to citizen parents abroad.

membership in the state granted to the general public, . . . and it implies a certain equality
among members.”); Robert J. Shulman, Children of a Lesser God: Should the Fourteenth
Amendment Be Altered or Repealed to Deny Automatic Citizenship Rights and Privileges to
American Born Children of Illegal Aliens?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 669, 689 (1995) (“While most
rights and privileges are enjoyed by both citizens and non-citizens within the boundaries of
the United States, certain privileges are available only to citizens.” (citation omitted)).
131
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 189 (2006) (arguing that the U.S. has drifted away
from the concept of using immigration law as a way to facilitate integration and move
immigrants toward substantive citizenship, and that the U.S. would benefit from returning to
immigration laws based on this concept of “immigration as transition”).
132
Like any analogy, this one is imperfect. One problem is that the highway analogy
suggests that some individuals are closer to substantive citizenship than others based entirely
on how they initially access the trajectory and that formal citizenship becomes useless once
an individual has reached that destination. A perhaps more accurate, though certainly less
helpful, analogy might be an asymptotic highway—one that infinitely approaches a
destination without ever reaching it. In that case, substantive citizenship might be analogized
to the direction of travel, rather than any specific final destination. Such a modified analogy
preserves the value of formal citizenship and dispels the notion that an individual may be
closer to a defined destination depending on the particular citizenship rule through which she
accessed the highway.
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Regardless of how individuals access the citizenship path, they are all subject to the
same rules and enjoy the same benefits.
Second, the citizenship path offers a set of rights and protections not available
to noncitizens, much as a highway offers speedier travel, increased safety, and a set
of rules that order travel on the highway so that travelers may reach their destinations
sooner and more efficiently than those on ordinary roads. The rights and benefits of
formal citizenship protect individuals in their development and maintenance of
substantive citizenship. U.S. citizens, for example, may vote in federal elections and
apply for federal means-tested welfare benefits. These rights allow citizens
meaningful ways to further develop and maintain substantive citizenship.
Noncitizens do not have access to these benefits.
Third, just as individuals may travel toward a destination without traveling on
the highway, individuals may develop substantive citizenship outside the protections
of formal citizenship. This might be visualized as individuals traveling on parallel
roads toward the same destination as those on the citizenship path. That is, the
citizenship map includes many other roads and paths. Of course, individuals who
are not on the highway lack the benefits and protections the highway offers—they
may travel more slowly and encounter more obstructions, for example. The case of
naturalization is illustrative. Many immigrants never naturalize. Some choose not
to, some are not eligible, and others simply do not know how. This does not
necessarily prevent them from developing substantive citizenship; in fact,
individuals may develop the very same substantive citizenship that their formal
citizen counterparts develop.
Fourth, just as some individuals move toward a destination without entering the
highway, others fail to move toward a destination despite being on the highway. The
mere fact of being on a highway does not guarantee that travelers will effectively
and speedily travel toward the destination or that travelers will move toward any
destination at all. There may be travelers stalled on the side of the highway or even
moving against the flow of traffic. Such individuals make travel on the highway less
efficient and even dangerous for all travelers. The same holds true on the citizenship
trajectory. Some individuals gain access to citizenship, but do not develop
substantive citizenship. Some may even affirmatively avoid developing substantive
citizenship.
Finally, every state’s “citizenship map” will be different. The framework I
provide here is meant to apply to many different states, regardless of their individual
“citizenship map,” but because states have different conceptions of substantive
citizenship, the path to substantive citizenship may be different for each state. In the
same way that one may observe that rivers generally run downhill and toward an
ocean without knowing the precise direction of the river or the precise location of
the ocean, formal citizenship leads (or at least ought to lead) to substantive
citizenship, whatever its contours. Formal citizenship rules, described below,
provide access to that path.
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B. A Typology of Citizenship Rules
Citizenship rules provide diverse means for accessing that trajectory—distinct
entrances onto the highway. But not all citizenship rules are located at the same point
along the citizenship path, nor do they provide access in exactly the same way. As
discussed below, formal citizenship rules can play one or more of several different
roles in relation to the citizenship highway. Citizenship rules may be descriptive,
predictive, conscriptive, and/or prescriptive in nature. Ultimately, each type of rule
advances the ideal of a formal citizenry composed of substantive citizens without
requiring all formal citizens to be substantive citizens. This, in turn, takes into
account the potential transformative power of formal citizenship.
1. Descriptive Citizenship Rules
A state may confer formal citizenship on an individual who displays substantive
citizenship. I label such citizenship rules “descriptive” because the formal status is
meant to describe or affirm the individual’s substantive citizenship. The acquisition
of citizenship certifies that the individual is fit for the obligations of citizenship and
deserves the benefits of citizenship. The development of some level of substantive
citizenship, then, is the precursor and qualifier for bestowal of formal citizenship.
Naturalization rules may play such a descriptive role.133 Indeed, scholarship on
naturalization sometimes treats naturalization law as a measure of the meaning of
substantive citizenship in a state.134 The assumption is that a state does not bestow
citizenship on an individual if that individual has not shown sufficient substantive
citizenship or somehow proves to be a desirable citizen.135 In the United States,
naturalization candidates must prove basic English proficiency, threshold
knowledge of U.S. history and civics, good moral character and attachment to the
Constitution, as well as meeting residency and physical presence requirements.136
One might think of an individual’s fulfillment of these requirements as evidence that
133

See Neuman, supra note 7, at 241 (describing a “thick communitarian” model of
naturalization in which citizenship reflects the identity of its members: “The community
offers naturalization to those individuals who meet its criteria of identity or are making
satisfactory progress toward that goal.”).
134
See, e.g., SPIRO, supra note 25, at 33 (explaining that “rules relating to naturalization
open a window on the meaning of national identity” and suggesting that “the nation’s
aspirations are reflected in its naturalization regime”).
135
This view of naturalization as a descriptive citizenship rule coincides with the
bilateral liberalism that Gerald Neuman describes. See Neuman, supra note 7, at 239–40. In
bilateral liberalism, the state’s evaluation of who is a desirable citizen interacts with the
individual’s need and desire to be a citizen. Id. Gerald Neuman argues that although the
“rhetoric of U.S. naturalization law fits the model of bilateral liberalism,” U.S. naturalization
criteria more accurately fit into his conception of unilateral liberalism, which focuses on the
individual’s need and desire to be a citizen rather than the state’s interest in determining what
kinds of individuals should be citizens. Id. at 240. This unilateral liberalism complements
the ideas of prescriptive citizenship below.
136
See I.N.A. § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (2012).
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the individual has demonstrated his substantive citizenship in the United States and
is ready for the obligations, rights, and symbolic approval associated with
citizenship.137 While U.S. naturalization rules indeed have a descriptive flavor,138 I
believe (and argue later in this Article) that they are perhaps more accurately
characterized as prescriptive in nature.
German naturalization rules, however, provide a more striking example of
descriptive citizenship rules. Historically, Germany’s naturalization rules employed
citizenship as the state’s certification that the citizen had achieved ethnocultural
assimilation139—that is, Germany’s version of substantive citizenship has
historically been tied to ethnicity and culture.140 Until 2000, for example, Germany
granted birthright citizenship solely on the principle of jus sanguinis, primarily
because of the “traditional, romantic-biological, and monocultural ideology of a
German Volk,”141 membership in which, it was argued, an individual is powerless to
obtain or relinquish.142 Even if foreigners met this level of assimilation,
naturalization depended on a favorable exercise of discretion, granted only where
there was a public interest in the individual obtaining citizenship.143 A candidate had
137

See Lister, supra note 82, at 219 (arguing that naturalization requirements “ensure a
commitment to the country of immigration” and “ensure assimilation into the culture of the
country”).
138
See, e.g., Lister, supra note 82, at 220-30. Matthew Lister rejects Pickus’ call for
more difficult naturalization requirements in order to compel assimilation to the “national
identity,” and accepts Carens’ view that the United States should require only a period of
residency for naturalization, not English language proficiency or civics knowledge,
suggesting that the current naturalization requirements are not enforced rigorously enough
to be prescriptive. Id. (citing Joseph H. Carens, Why Naturalization Should Be Easy: A
Response to Noah Pickus, in IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY, supra note 126, at 141, 141–46); Pickus, supra note 126, at 127–29.
139
BRETT KLOPP, GERMAN MULTICULTURALISM: IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CITIZENSHIP 40 (2002) (“German debates about exclusive citizenship
versus multiculturalism are set significantly apart from similar debates elsewhere due to
Germany’s historical legacy and its mythology of the prepolitical, natural Volk, which to this
day colors German naturalization law . . . .”).
140
Hartnell, supra note 125, at 373 (“Germany is typically viewed as exemplifying the
primordialist or organicist view that belonging presupposes ethno-cultural homogeneity.”).
141
German naturalization was limited to individuals who were integrated in the German
way of life (Einordnung) and displayed a voluntary and lasting affiliation (Hinwendung) with
the state. Dilek Çinar, From Aliens to Citizens: A Comparative Analysis of Rules of
Transition
9
(Institut
für
Höhere
Studien,
Paper
No.
17,
1994),
https://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS9M-9ME2]; see also
KLOPP, supra note 139, at 43–44 (cataloguing German citizenship developments, including
the passage of Germany’s 1913 citizenship law and subsequent amendments).
142
KLOPP, supra note 139, at 40–41. Until the 1970s, it was even difficult for a foreign
spouse to gain citizenship independent of the German spouse. See id. at 43.
143
Çinar, supra note 141, at 9. Ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern European
States (Aussiedler) have “an unconditional right to German citizenship if they can prove their
ethnic German origins.” Id. Generally, spouses of German citizens, long-term residents, and

2016]

MAPPING CITIZENSHIP

511

to prove that she had become thoroughly and deeply German. As a result, until
reforms in the 1990s, second- and third-generation foreigners acquired citizenship
only after a complicated and lengthy process subject to the state’s sole discretion—
a right or entitlement to naturalization did not exist until 2000.144 For Germany, the
purpose of “naturalization is not to foster an individual’s integration into German
society, but rather to affirm or even consecrate integration after it has occurred.”145
More recent reforms have loosened the requirements of naturalization, but
naturalization in Germany remains complicated and burdensome.146
Popular rhetoric surrounding citizenship and immigration often paints an image
of formal citizenship serving a descriptive role. Popular terms in the citizenship and
immigration debate include “path to citizenship” and “earned citizenship,”
suggesting that the purpose of formal citizenship is to certify an individual’s fitness

young foreigners who meet all the requirements receive favorable exercises of discretion. Id.
at 10; KLOPP, supra note 139, at 43.
144
LYNCH & SIMON, supra note 80, at 177; see also Ciro Avitabile et al., The Effect of
Birthright Citizenship on Parental Integration Outcomes, 56 J.L. & ECON. 777, 782–83
(2013) (“The changes [in 1990 and 1993] introduced limited discretion of officials to deny
naturalization and provided foreigners with the legal right to claim naturalization. . . . The
law approved in 1999 introduced further changes to the naturalization criteria: it lowered the
minimum residency requirement to 8 years (without age restriction) and refined the legal
entitlement to naturalization with additional requirements such as swearing loyalty to the
German constitution, being able to support oneself and one’s family without social security
or unemployment benefits, a clean criminal record, and adequate command of the German
language. Moreover, applicants had to renounce their former citizenship, to which they were
legally entitled only if they are 18 or older.”). For an overview of the evolution of German
naturalization law, see Marc Morjé Howard, The Causes and Consequences of Germany’s
New Citizenship Law, 17 GERMAN POL. 41, 41–43 (2008).
145
MOTOMURA, supra note 131, at 145–46 (describing German naturalization as
historically meaning that “the applicant becomes German in a profound way, through
something of a change of identity”); see Kay Hailbronner, Citizenship and Nationhood in
Germany, in IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE AND NORTH
AMERICA 67, 79 (William Rogers Brubaker ed., 1989).
146
Simon Green, Much Ado About Not-Very-Much? Assessing Ten Years of German
Citizenship Reform, 16 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 173 (2012) (analyzing recent amendments to
Germany’s citizenship policy and analyzing their relationship to declining naturalizations);
see also Naturalization/Receiving German Citizenship, INTEGRATION IN BONN,
http://www.integration-in-bonn.de/en/permission-of-residence/naturalization-receivinggerman-citizenship.html [https://perma.cc/S8KD-FBVM] (last visited May 8, 2016)
(summarizing the requirements of qualifying for citizenship at birth in Germany);
Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz [StAG] [Nationality Act], July 22, 1913, as amended,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT,
Teil
I
[BGBL.
I]
(Ger.),
https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_rustag/nationality_act.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8EB-4AYP] (providing
an English translation of Germany’s Nationality Act, which lists the requirements for
acquiring German citizenship). Japan has also employed very restrictive citizenship rules
that involve stringent ethnic and cultural components. Nonethnic Japanese individuals are all
but barred from naturalizing. See LYNCH & SIMON, supra note 80, at 189–96.
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for inclusion in the polity.147 But citizenship rules do more than merely evaluate and
certify fitness for citizenship.
2. Predictive Citizenship Rules
Citizenship rules may also play a predictive role. A state may grant formal
citizenship to individuals who are likely to become substantive citizens. The
bestowal of formal citizenship now protects and facilitates the likelihood substantive
membership later. Jus soli provides an intuitive illustration.148 An infant born within
the state is not a substantive citizen at the time she becomes a citizen. She has no
quality—no sense of loyalty, shared identity, or shared culture, for example—that
would suggest she is a substantive citizen. Nonetheless, presence within the state at
birth may suggest that the child is likely to grow up within the state boundaries,
associate with other individuals within the state boundaries, attend school within the
147

For example, President Barack Obama has spoken of earned citizenship in his public
speeches. While President Obama’s immigration policy objectives are not necessarily
accurately or fully described in his statements regarding earned citizenship, the choice to
discuss immigration in these terms evidences the tenor of public rhetoric:
We have to deal with the 11 million individuals who are here illegally. We all
agree that these men and women should have to earn their way to citizenship. But
for comprehensive immigration reform to work, it must be clear from the outset
that there is a pathway to citizenship. We’ve got to lay out a path—a process that
includes passing a background check, paying taxes, paying a penalty, learning
English, and then going to the back of the line, behind all the folks who are trying
to come here legally. That’s only fair.
Earned Citizenship, supra note 129. Jeb Bush, a former candidate for the 2016 Republican
presidential nomination, has made remarkably similar comments, referring to “legal status”
instead of “citizenship,” however:
My suggestion is earned legal status. Not earned citizenship, but earned legal
status. You don’t create a system where people cut in line in front of those who
have been patiently waiting. But you get a provisional work permit, you work,
you pay taxes, you pay a fine, you learn English, you don’t commit crimes, and
you earn—over an extended period of time—legal status.
Editorial, Jeb’s Smart Stand As Bush Breaks with GOP Obstruction, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr.
19, 2015, 4:05 AM) (on file with the Utah Law Review), http://www.nydailynews.com/
opinion/editorial-jeb-smart-stands-article-1.2189539; Andrew Kaczynski, Spokesman: Jeb
Bush Supports “Legal Status,” But Could Support Pathway to Citizenship “(Depending) on
the Details,” BUZZFEED NEWS (May 3, 2015, 2:43 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/andrew
kaczynski/jeb-bush-could-support-a-pathway-to-citizenship-for-undocume#.yo8L86Qzmg
[https://perma.cc/2TRQ-2Y2A].
148
SPIRO, supra note 25, at 9–10 (arguing that birthright citizenship based on birth in
the territory “ma[kes] sense in a world in which the fact of birth in U.S. territory was likely
to coincide with actual subsequent assimilation into the American community.”).
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state, and therefore develop a sense of identity that is tied to the state.149 Granting
formal citizenship protects this likelihood by ensuring that the individual has access
to rights and benefits that, in turn, help him develop substantive citizenship.
Arguably, the U.S. version of jus sanguinis similarly distributes citizenship to
individuals who are likely to develop substantive citizenship. Individuals who are
born abroad to U.S. citizens may be likely to develop an affinity for the United
States. This is particularly so where the citizen parents have spent significant time
in the United States, as U.S. law requires for jus sanguinis to apply.150
Naturalization can also be thought of as a predictive citizenship rule. An
individual who meets the qualifications for naturalization, the argument might go, is
likely to continue developing the qualities of substantive citizenship if allowed to.
In the United States, it may be that someone who is willing to study for the
naturalization interview, willing to learn sufficient English, and who appears at a
ceremony that confers citizenship is likely to continue learning about her new
country and increasingly identify with that country over time.
This is not to say that naturalization or birthright citizenship rules necessarily
and consistently do a good job of playing this predictive role.151 Rather, I am offering
a set of terms that we might use to evaluate and describe citizenship rules. The
predictive value of birth within the territory, and therefore the predictive role of
territorial birthright citizenship rules, may depend on a variety of factors. The size
of the state, proximity of the state to other states, the economic opportunities of the
state relative to surrounding states, the ease of travel into and out of the state, etc.,
all bear on the predictive value of birth within the state. For example, where travel
into and out of the state is difficult, there is a stronger likelihood that those born
within the state will remain within the state and therefore forge the ties described
above. Birth within a small state surrounded by multiple states that have stronger
economies may not be predictive of a strong tie with the first state.
3. Conscriptive Citizenship Rules
Conscriptive citizenship rules distribute formal citizenship without regard for
the individual’s current or future substantive citizenship. A conscriptive citizenship
rule is one that obligates an individual to the state for the state’s benefit despite the
149

Id. at 17 (“Persons born in the United States, regardless of parentage, in many cases
could be expected to make their lives in the country, to become members of the national
community as a matter of fact.”).
150
For example, a child born abroad to one U.S. citizen and one noncitizen in wedlock
is a U.S. citizen only if the U.S. citizen parent has spent five years in the United States prior
to the birth of the child. I.N.A. § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2012). Even where both parents
are U.S. citizens, a child born in wedlock will be a citizen only if one of the parents has had
a residence in the United States prior to the child’s birth. I.N.A. § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401. For
rules applying to children born out of wedlock, see I.N.A. §§ 301, 309, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g),
1409).
151
See Neuman, supra note 7, at 249 (arguing that jus soli “operates too randomly to
be understood as preserving any particular national identity”).
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individual’s own (and potentially contrary) sense of substantive citizenship.
Conscriptive citizenship rules differ from the other types of citizenship rules
discussed in this Article in that instead of seeking to preserve, promote, or predict a
sense of substantive citizenship, conscriptive citizenship rules operate in spite of and
without reference to substantive citizenship.
This abstract definition is admittedly hard to illustrate—how does one evaluate
whether a citizenship rule operates contrary to individuals’ current or future
substantive citizenship? One must look beyond the rule itself and to the rights,
benefits, and obligations offered to citizens. There are several factors that might help
identify a conscriptive citizenship rule or a state that employs a conscriptive
citizenship system. Citizenship that is distributed to individuals without a possibility
of the citizen renouncing that citizenship is likely conscriptive. Under such a
citizenship rule, the individual has no recourse should she determine that she is not
and does not want to become a substantive citizen of the state. But other markers are
relevant. A lack of reciprocal obligations between citizens and sovereign suggests
the existence of conscriptive citizenship. For example, a state that offers few if any
rights or protections to its citizens might be said to impose conscriptive citizenship.
Likewise, a state that unilaterally imposes significant and unwelcome obligations on
its citizens may also be fairly described as employing conscriptive citizenship.
The conscriptive category of citizenship rules is perhaps most relevant in a
historical context. Some states have historically limited their citizens’ or subjects’
ability to renounce citizenship and have provided very limited rights to those
citizens. China152 and the former Soviet Union153 arguably employed conscriptive

152

See Nationality Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 1 (Sept. 10, 1980),
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/ywzn/lsyw/vpna/faq/t710012.htm
[https://perma.cc/3ZMP-5LJ2].
153
See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Law on Citizenship, July 1, 1979, 20 I.L.M.
1207, art. 11 (“A child, both of whose parents at the time of its birth were citizens of the
USSR, is a citizen of the USSR, irrespective of whether being born on the territory of the
USSR or outside of the USSR.”). Eric Lohr describes Bolshevik citizenship policies in the
early twentieth century as follows:
Despite its attempts to attract immigrants and return migrants in 1920, in
November of the same year the regime took a hard line on émigrés who did not
return immediately. Decrees of November 3 and 19, 1920, ordered the
confiscation of all land, housing, and personal possessions of individuals who had
left the territory of the [Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic]. This
amounted to a powerful policy against the return of émigrés and refugees, and it
established the basic Bolshevik approach to its diaspora: return immediately or
never.
....
From 1926 to 1930, nearly all aspects of the citizenship boundary became
more firm and restrictive. Immigration, emigration, naturalization, and
denaturalization all became much more difficult. There were several motives for
the restrictive turn—xenophobia, security-mania, ideological zeal, and an all-
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citizenship rules in the past. Both prevented their citizens from traveling abroad,
except in controlled circumstances;154 voluntarily renouncing citizenship;155
naturalizing in another state;156 and exercising any meaningful political rights.157

consuming desire to prevent the loss of hard currency, precious metals, and other
valuables through illicit export.
ERIC LOHR, RUSSIAN CITIZENSHIP: FROM EMPIRE TO SOVIET UNION 147, 171 (2012) (ebook)
(citation omitted).
154
LOHR, supra note 153, at 175 (“[In the 1930s, e]migration was almost completely
banned for Soviet citizens, and for the first time in Russian history this ban was actually
enforced. The border was sealed as never before.”); Michael L. Waddle, Physical
Environment and Population, in CHINA: A COUNTRY STUDY 59, 83 (Robert L. Worden et al.
eds., 4th ed. 1988) (“Through most of China’s history, strict controls prevented large
numbers of people from leaving the country. In modern times, however, periodically some
have been allowed to leave for various reasons.”); Thomas M. Magstadt, Emigration and
Citizenship: Implications for Soviet-American Relations (Cato Policy Analysis, Paper No.
70, 1980), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa070.html [https://perma.cc/9GFK-U465].
155
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Law on Citizenship, art. 17 (“Renunciation of
citizenship of the USSR is sanctioned by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
A sanction to renounce citizenship of the USSR may not be granted if the person applying
for renunciation has unfulfilled commitments to the state or property commitments involving
the essential interests of citizens or state, cooperative and other public organi[z]ations.
Renunciation of citizenship of the USSR is not permitted if the person applying for
renunciation is called to account as a defendant or there is against him a sentence of a court
of law, which has taken legal effect and is to be enforced, or if renunciation of citizenship of
the USSR by the person runs counter to the interests of state security of the USSR.”
(emphases added)).
156
Nationality Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 3 (“The People’s Republic
of China does not recognize dual nationality for any Chinese national.”); id. art. 9 (“Any
Chinese national who has settled abroad and who has been naturalized as a foreign national
or has acquired foreign nationality of his own free will shall automatically lose Chinese
nationality.”); Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Law on Citizenship, art. 8 (“No person,
being a USSR citizen, shall be recogni[z]ed as having a foreign nationality.”); LOHR, supra
note 153, at 176 (“In case after case regarding people who had the chance to opt for other
citizenships but had not done so by the established deadline, the government upheld their
ascribed status as Soviet citizens (even if they had no documents and had not undergone any
formal ceremony, and even if another state claimed them to be eligible for their citizenship).
Only after a lengthy and by no means automatic appeals process could these individuals be
released from Soviet citizenship and allowed to leave the country.”).
157
LOHR, supra note 153, at 151 (“The great denaturalization of Russians abroad fits
into the broader context of the Soviet approach to domestic citizenship, which included a
peculiar variant of partial denaturalization that involved deprivation of the rights of
citizenship while retaining the obligations and status of citizen.”); Freedom in the World
Country Ratings: 1972–2014, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/
Individual%20Country%20Ratings%20and%20Status%2C%201973-2015%20%28FINAL
%29.xls [https://perma.cc/ALL8-C2CZ] (last visited May 9, 2016) (giving the Soviet Union
and communist China consistently low political rights and civil liberties scores).
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In many ways, the concept of conscriptive citizenship lines up with many
commentators’ understanding of “ascriptive citizenship.”158 I decline to use that term
here, however, for two reasons. First, the term “ascriptive citizenship” suffers from
ambiguity in the citizenship literature. Second, some commentators have used the
term “ascriptive citizenship” to challenge territorial birthright citizenship rules.
While my use of “conscriptive citizenship” aligns well with those commentators’
general descriptions of “ascriptive citizenship,” I disagree that jus soli constitutes an
ascriptive—or (in my framework) conscriptive—citizenship rule.
The term “ascriptive citizenship” is well established in legal commentaries on
citizenship, thanks in large part to Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith’s detailed
treatment of the concept in Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the
American Polity.159 The term, however, suffers from ambiguity. Some use the term
“ascriptive” to refer to citizenship rules that automatically distribute citizenship to
individuals based on some objectively identifiable criteria.160 Under this conception
of ascriptive citizenship, all birthright citizenship rules are ascriptive because they
work automatically at birth based on the circumstances of birth. Often, however, the
term “ascriptive” carries a connotation of unfairness and arbitrariness.161 Two
varieties of this more negative version of “ascriptive citizenship” exist. Some
discussions of a negative version of ascriptive citizenship focus on unfairness to the
state: by automatically conferring citizenship on individuals, the state loses its ability
to consent to each citizen’s inclusion in the polity.162 Others focus on the unfairness
158

In fact, it is only because “ascriptive citizenship” occupies such an important place
in citizenship scholarship that I include conscriptive citizenship at all. Because conscriptive
citizenship describes so few citizenship rules, it is not as helpful as the other categories I
have created. But it is important to contextualize those categories in the literature about
ascriptive citizenship, which I distinguish from conscriptive citizenship, particularly because
many commentators have described territorial birthright citizenship, a topic featured in Part
V of this Article, in their discussions of ascriptive citizenship.
159
SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 15.
160
See, e.g., RUTH RUBIO-MARÍN, IMMIGRATION AS A DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE:
CITIZENSHIP AND INCLUSION IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 8 (2000) (proposing a
system of European citizenship in which “permanent residents could be ‘automatically’
granted citizenship—that is, citizenship could be ascribed to all residents after a certain
number of years, even to those who would not choose to opt for naturalization under a
voluntary naturalization approach”); see also Jo Shaw, E.U. Citizenship and Political Rights
in an Evolving European Union, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2549, 2563 (2007) (recognizing that
there is “nothing like a system of automatic or ascriptive citizenship acquisition for resident
non-nationals . . . in the E.U. Member States”).
161
Matthew Lister has highlighted the unwarranted connotation the term has developed.
Lister, supra note 82, at 216 (“[I]t is important to see that a jus soli rule need not have the
negative ‘ascriptive’ aspects attributed to it by Shuck, Cohen, Smith, and others. Such a
contention confuses historical fact with conceptual necessity.”); see SCHUCK & SMITH, supra
note 10, at 9–22.
162
See, e.g., SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 20–21; Elizabeth F. Cohen, Carved
from the Inside Out: Immigration and America’s Public Philosophy on Citizenship, in
DEBATING IMMIGRATION 32, 41 (Carol M. Swain ed., 2007) (arguing that jus soli is a form
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to citizens: the automatic bestowal of citizenship on an individual imposes
citizenship on the individual without her consent.163
This more negative understanding of ascriptive citizenship has roots in modern
academic debates about the U.S. practice of distributing citizenship to the U.S.-born
children of undocumented immigrants. Elizabeth Cohen, Peter Schuck, Rogers
Smith, and others have used the term to argue that jus soli is an illegitimate basis for
distributing citizenship in the United States.164 They argue that the distribution of
citizenship based on birth within state territory—jus soli—is rooted in antiquated
notions of citizenship and therefore foreign to the consensualist underpinnings of
the U.S. Constitution.165 For Schuck and Smith, the most problematic aspect is the
lack of consent on the part of the citizen, though they also refer to the state’s lack of
consent.166 Elizabeth Cohen’s primary objection to birthright territorial citizenship
is the state’s lack of consent.167 Others have persuasively challenged these arguments
of ascriptive citizenship that “deprives both the community and the individual [gaining
citizenship] of the opportunity to come to reasoned conclusions about membership”).
163
See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 20–21; Cohen, supra note 162, at 41.
164
See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 116–17; Cohen, supra note 162, at 40–45.
165
SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, 116–18; Cohen, supra note 162, at 40–45; Stevens,
supra note 116, at 340–45.
166
Schuck and Smith trace the history of ascriptive citizenship to medieval notions of
“natural” allegiance. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 15. An infant born within the
sovereign’s territory, whose birth there resulted from divine will, owed a “debt of allegiance
due in return for protection received.” Id. at 15–16. The subject “owed complete obedience
and service; the sovereign owed physical protection and just governance.” Id. at 17. This
relationship was irrevocable and perpetual. Id. In practice, however, irrevocability was more
binding on the subject. See id. The sovereign’s failure to protect the subject did not release
the subject from his obligation of allegiance, but the subject’s failure to render allegiance
was grounds for banishment or worse. See id. In order to keep individuals from freely
absolving themselves of their debt of fealty, ascriptive citizenship includes not only a
nonconsensual entry strategy to citizenship (birth) but also a nonexistent or severely limited
exit strategy to citizenship. See id. Thus, based on Schuck and Smith’s historical account,
the hallmark of ascriptive citizenship is lack of consent on the part of the citizen and an
inability to terminate her relationship with the state.
Schuck and Smith argue that jus soli is a form of ascriptive citizenship because it (1)
imposes citizenship on individuals who have not consented to citizenship and to whom the
state has not consented (2) based on the accidental circumstance of birth within the territory.
See id at 13–17. Such a system, the argument goes, runs counter to the consensualist notions
of citizenship that underlie the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 116–17. Jus sanguinis—
citizenship based on birth to a citizen parent—they argue, is a more appropriate and consentbased form of citizenship. See id. Schuck and Smith propose a reinterpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment that does not require the distribution of citizenship to the children of
undocumented immigrants. See id.
167
Cohen argues that the commonly understood foundations of jus soli do not actually
support its modern application. Cohen, supra note 162, at 44–45. She emphasizes the
circumstances surrounding Calvin’s Case—which is commonly cited as the origin of
American jus soli. Id. at 40–45. In Calvin’s Case, she argues, “it was borders rather than
people doing the migrating” in that it “resolved the political status of people who had been
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against birthright citizenship, and I do not undertake a direct response to these
arguments here.168 I do, however, comment on territorial birthright citizenship in
Part V of this paper using the framework developed in this Part. Because my
arguments about jus soli are at odds with those of Schuck, Smith, and Cohen, I
choose to use a new term, “conscriptive citizenship,” to refer to the types of
citizenship rules that they might label “ascriptive.”
4. Prescriptive Citizenship
Significantly neglected in contemporary public rhetoric about immigration and
citizenship is the prescriptive role of citizenship. Formal citizenship can prescribe
substantive citizenship: that is, formal citizenship can provide an individual the
rights, benefits, and opportunities that will nudge the individual toward the
development of substantive citizenship.169 In effect, formal citizenship can be a
mechanism for integrating and incorporating otherwise marginalized individuals and
groups into mainstream society. Formal citizenship can remove many of the
obstacles and challenges to integration and development of substantive membership
that such marginalized individuals and groups face.
The concept of prescriptive citizenship can be slightly harder to define and
distinguish from the other categories described in this Article. At first blush,
prescriptive citizenship might sound like conscriptive citizenship in that the state
uses a formal citizenship rule to achieve its own purpose. However, there are
important differences. In conscriptive citizenship, the state assigns formal
citizenship for the state’s own benefit without regard for the individual’s substantive
citizenship. In prescriptive citizenship, the state desires to integrate the individual
receiving citizenship and paves the path for the individual’s development of

born in Scotland after the ascent of a Scot, King James, to the British throne.” Id. at 41. But
modern citizenship rules are more related to the dynamics of immigration across sovereign
borders. Id. As such, modern rules must take into account more fundamental questions of
“Who do we want to be?” Id. at 45.
168
I agree with commentators who have argued that the conclusions of Shuck and
Smith, as well as others who subscribe to their understanding of ascriptive citizenship, are
undermined by their own argument. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, Race, Citizenship, and the
Search for Political Community Among ‘We the People,’ 76 OR. L. REV. 233, 238–42 (1997).
After all, their preferred citizenship rule, jus sanguinis, is subject to the very same critique
they use to challenge jus soli. Jus sanguinis imposes citizenship on an infant that has not
consented to citizenship based on something entirely outside of the child’s control. SCHUCK
& SMITH, supra note 10, at 117–18. Consent plays no real role. Moreover, Schuck and Smith
fail to account for the fact that most states’ versions of jus soli allow a citizen to terminate
citizenship at will. The right to subsequently reject citizenship might fairly be characterized
to represent consent to that citizenship. The absence of irrevocability in most modern
applications of jus soli weighs against labeling jus soli as categorically ascriptive in nature.
169
See MOTOMURA, supra note 131, at 189; Safran, supra note 79, at 314 (identifying
the bestowal of citizenship as a historical means to integrate immigrants into the political
community).
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substantive citizenship.170 The goal of prescriptive citizenship is that the individual’s
substantive citizenship will align with the individual’s formal citizenship. The goals
of conscriptive citizenship are unrelated to the individual’s substantive membership.
A state that employs prescriptive citizenship rules offers protections, rights, and
benefits to individuals in order to foster the development of substantive citizenship.
A state that employs conscriptive citizenship rules may disproportionately impose
burdens without corresponding protections.
Prescriptive citizenship can also seem to overlap with predictive citizenship.
After all, if a prescriptive citizenship rule is effective, it will consistently and
predictably produce the desired result—individual citizens’ development of
substantive citizenship. One can predict the individual’s development of substantive
citizenship by virtue of the conferral of formal citizenship. This is indeed the ideal
result of a prescriptive citizenship rule, but the rationales for prescriptive and
predictive citizenship rules are different. A state employs a prescriptive citizenship
rule in order to catalyze the development of substantive citizenship in individuals
who otherwise might not have developed substantive citizenship. A state employs a
predictive citizenship rule to merely sanction what it already expects will happen. In
both instances, the effect is the same—formal citizenship protects and fosters the
development of substantive citizenship—but the rationale is different. This
difference in rationale is important because it affects the ultimate contours of a
citizenship rule. If the state focuses on predictive citizenship, it may enact formal
citizenship rules that confer citizenship on individuals it views as mainstream
members of society. If the state focuses on prescriptive citizenship, it may extend
citizenship to marginalized individuals who could use the protections of formal
citizenship in developing substantive citizenship and ultimately integrating into
mainstream society.
The concept of prescriptive citizenship recognizes the transformative power of
formal citizenship—formal citizenship can help individuals move toward
substantive citizenship. Hiroshi Motomura’s concept of “immigration as transition”
leads naturally to the notion of prescriptive citizenship. In Americans in Waiting,
Motomura proposes treating new immigrants like citizens to give “lawful
immigrants the best chance to belong in America, in a broad sense that goes beyond

170

The precise mechanisms by which formal citizenship can help an individual develop
substantive citizenship (and the effectiveness of that relationship) depend entirely on the
state’s understanding of substantive citizenship, the particular rules by which it grants formal
citizenship, and the rights and benefits associated with citizenship. Again, I do not undertake
an examination of the contours of substantive citizenship in the United States or anywhere
else, and I make no normative judgments about particular views of substantive citizenship in
this Article. Rather, I propose that formal citizenship can affect substantive citizenship in a
variety of ways, depending on the content of that substantive citizenship. The state may have
various reasons for prescribing membership. The state may recognize that, absent a grant of
formal citizenship, certain classes of individuals may become an underclass. The state may
also wish to facilitate the development of substantive citizenship in individuals who have
expressed an independent desire to do so. Other reasons may exist.
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formal citizenship to include integration into American society.”171 In essence,
Motomura advocates extending many rights172 currently available only to citizens to
new immigrants to foster “a fuller sense of belonging through family, education, and
economic opportunity.”173 As Motomura recognizes, however, this transition does
not end with the acquisition of formal citizenship through naturalization. To the
contrary, naturalization is itself part of the integration process: it “is neither a start
nor an end point, but an important milestone along the way.”174
U.S. citizenship acquired through naturalization indeed provides the most
intuitive case of prescriptive citizenship. Though naturalization imposes
requirements on candidates, they are less burdensome than in many other states.175
Naturalization requirements do not restrict formal citizenship to only those
individuals whose identities are inextricably tied to the state or who have fully
integrated into society. That is, naturalization requirements do not necessarily ensure
that those who naturalize are substantive citizens. But this is not a failing of
naturalization. Rather, naturalization can be seen as a tool of transition for the
individual applicant; naturalization fosters greater commitment to and membership
in society.176 In fact, the process itself—the study of U.S. history and civics, the
171

MOTOMURA, supra note 131, at 189.
Id. at 190–97 (advocating for immigrant welfare benefits, voting rights, the right to
serve in public office or public employment, and protection against deportation).
173
Id. at 162.
174
Id. at 164.
175
See id. at 145–47 (comparing the approaches of German immigration law, which
“consecrates” integration that has already occurred, with American immigration law); see
also RAINER BAUBÖCK ET AL., EUROPEAN UNIV. INST., ACCESS TO CITIZENSHIP AND ITS
IMPACT ON IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION: EUROPEAN SUMMARY AND STANDARDS 2–21 (2013),
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/images/acit/acit_report_eu%20level%20summary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RN98-B7P2] (providing a statistical analysis comparing the naturalization
requirements within Europe); BRONWEN MANBY, OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., CITIZENSHIP LAW
IN
AFRICA:
A
COMPARATIVE
STUDY
64–72
(2d
ed.
2010),
http://www.unhcr.org/4cbc60ce6.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG36-9GXW] (charting the
difficulty of obtaining citizenship in many African nations).
176
See MOTOMURA, supra note 131, at 189–200. Compare this view of naturalization
to that of Noah Pickus, who argues that current naturalization procedures do not adequately
“generate[] a sense of mutual commitment among all Americans, naturalized and native-born
alike.” Pickus, supra note 126, at 108. He suggests that U.S. naturalization should be more
substantive and symbolic. Id. at 126. To put his arguments in terms of the framework
provided in this Article, Pickus takes a particular view of substantive citizenship in the
United States and argues that naturalization should be descriptive with respect to that view
of substantive citizenship. Id. Joseph Carens, on the other hand, proposes that a minimum
residency requirement is the only defensible requirement for naturalization. Carens, supra
note 138, at 142. His approach takes a more prescriptive view of naturalization in that he
distinguishes between the requirements of naturalization and the aspirations for naturalized
citizens. Id. at 142–46 (“What about loyalty, patriotism, and identity? Can’t we expect
immigrants to become attached to America? . . . [A]s a normative matter, we should not try
to impose such an expectation, much less make it a legal requirement. This is the sort of thing
we can try to encourage and foster, but it’s not the sort of thing we should try to command.”).
172
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efforts to become sufficiently proficient in English, the citizenship ceremony—
promotes substantive citizenship even if only alerting new citizens to concepts,
processes, and history that are widely believed to be important and fundamental to
substantive citizenship in the United States.177
Perhaps less obvious is how formal citizenship can play a prescriptive role even
outside the realm of naturalization. Jus soli plays a prescriptive role in U.S.
citizenship law, both on an individual level and on a group basis. For an individual,
birthright citizenship secures the full suite of rights and benefits available in the
state. This arguably maximizes the individual’s opportunity to develop substantive
citizenship and a sense of belonging in the community that, in turn, prepares the
individual for assuming the obligations of citizenship.178 Citizenship shapes an
individual’s sense of identity, loyalty, sense of place, and sense of belonging.179 This
is particularly important for first-generation U.S. citizens, but remains true for
children descended from a long line of citizens.
The prescriptive role of jus soli also plays out in the aggregate: the distribution
of formal citizenship to individual children born in the United States fosters the
integration of whole communities over time. The conferral of citizenship on a single
Carens, however, does not adequately account for the capacity to foster substantive
citizenship inherent in formal citizenship itself.
177
MOTOMURA, supra note 131, at 156–57 (urging the use of the “civics and history
requirements to educate rather than purely to test”).
178
GERISON LANSDOWN, UNICEF, THE EVOLVING CAPACITIES OF THE CHILD 17
(2005), http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/evolving-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/7V
6W-4Z7U] (asserting that individuals, including children, “build competence and confidence
through direct experience: Participation leads to greater levels of confidence, which in turn
enhances the quality of participation”).
179
See, e.g., Bhabha, supra note 14, at 58 (“As the child develops, so the balance
between ascriptive status and consensual identification shifts—the child changes from a
repository of protective concerns, a recipient of enabling inputs to an active
participant . . . .”); Caroline B. Brettell, Political Belonging and Cultural Belonging:
Immigration Status, Citizenship, and Identity Among Four Immigrant Populations in a
Southwestern City, 50 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 70, 70 (2006); Kelly Campbell et al.,
Exploring the Latino Paradox: How Economic and Citizenship Status Impact Health, 34
HISP. J. BEHAV. SCI. 187, 188 (2012); Ariana Mangual Figueroa, “I Have Papers So I Can
Go Anywhere!”: Everyday Talk About Citizenship in a Mixed-Status Mexican Family, 11 J.
LANGUAGE, IDENTITY, & EDUC. 291, 291 (2012) (“The findings show that siblings
communicate two key understandings during everyday conversations: first, the relevance of
migratory status to their day-to-day lives and second, their family’s shared conventions for
talking about citizenship in the home. As children and youth demonstrate the social norms
for talking about citizenship, they also express their understanding of the ways that being a
United States or Mexican citizen shapes their future opportunities.”); Roger Geertz
Gonzalez, Same and Different: Latino College Students’ Perceptions of Themselves and
Others on Campus, 12 J. HISP. HIGHER EDUC. 3, 17 (2013) (“[M]ost Latino college students
point to a political power hierarchy between the three groups based on country of origin:
Puerto Ricans who are natural born citizens, Cuban Americans who can stay and become
U.S. citizens based on the wet foot/dry foot policy, and Mexicans who have a harder time
acquiring citizenship when they enter the United States.”).
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individual can foster the development of substantive citizenship in that individual’s
parents, children, and grandchildren.180 As the individual with formal citizenship
enjoys the advantages of formal citizenship, she becomes an usher in her family’s
navigation of culture, language, government, politics, and more.181 In that sense, the
development of substantive citizenship “can be a multigenerational process.”182 The
Supreme Court’s decision in Wong Kim Ark183 triggered just such an aggregate
effect. There, the U.S.-born child of Chinese immigrants claimed that he was a U.S.
citizen by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.184 Though the United States did not
provide for the naturalization of any Chinese immigrants and did not allow Chinese
immigration at the time, the Court found that the claimant fell within the Fourteenth
Amendment’s citizenship clause.185 As a result, the operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment played an important role in placing Chinese communities on a
trajectory toward substantive citizenship in American society.186 I contextualize the
prescriptive role of jus soli in the larger debate about birthright citizenship in more
detail in Part V.
V. NAVIGATING MODERN IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP DEBATES
A more nuanced understanding of the roles that formal citizenship can play
with respect to substantive citizenship alleviates the apparent paradox created by
multiple paths to formal citizenship. Citizenship is much more than a stamp of
approval indicating an individual’s fitness for membership in the community,
though it can sometimes play just such a descriptive role. Citizenship is not a
destination, but rather a path to integration and belonging—substantive citizenship.
The fact that individuals who become citizens through naturalization, jus soli, and
180

See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 180–81 (2014)
(describing the way in which the conferral of legal residence and citizenship status on
children helps children “serve as cultural brokers between their parents and mainstream
society” despite their parents’ language barriers and immigration status).
181
See id.
182
See MOTOMURA, supra note 131, at 146–47 (“Jus soli reflects transition for families,
by assuring first-generation immigrant parents that their children born in the United States
will be citizens. Historically, this was especially important for Asian immigrants, who were
barred from naturalization, but whose U.S.-born children became citizens under the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 1898 decision in Wong Kim Ark. More fundamentally, jus soli recognizes
that transition can be a multigenerational process.”); see also MOTOMURA, supra note 180,
at 168–69 (discussing the relationship between local integration and national citizenship as
“mutually reinforcing”). In addition, the Fourteenth Amendment plays a more fundamental
anti-caste function that is most apparent in the citizenship rights associated with African
Americans. See Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination,
90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011); Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor
Balkin’s Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 669–70 (2009).
183
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
184
Id. at 649.
185
Id. at 702–05.
186
See MOTOMURA, supra note 131, at 146–47.
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jus sanguinis are not equally qualified at the moment of citizenship is not a failing
of citizenship law but an important feature that accounts for formal citizenship’s
ability to preserve and facilitate substantive citizenship.
Under the framework proposed here, political and academic debates regarding
citizenship and immigration can best be understood as arising from (1) disagreement
about which role formal citizenship should play with respect to substantive
citizenship or (2) whether a formal citizenship rule has or will successfully affect
substantive citizenship in the desired or expected way. Should birthright citizenship
be predictive in nature? Is it adequately fulfilling this role? What role should
naturalization play? Is it descriptive? If so, do naturalization requirements
adequately measure an individual’s substantive citizenship?
This dynamic is evident in many areas, but here I briefly discuss how my
framework helps spotlight the underlying tensions in two examples: (A) the
recurring proposals to exclude the children of undocumented immigrants from
access to territorial birthright citizenship and (B) the debate surrounding the
proposal and ultimate failure of the DREAM Act provide useful discussion
platforms.
A. Jus Soli and the U.S.-born Children of Undocumented Immigrants
U.S. law has historically operated (and continues to operate) on the premise
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of citizenship to all individuals
“born . . . in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof”187 included all
but the children of diplomats and “Indians not taxed.”188 In its landmark decision of
Wong Kim Ark, the Supreme Court held as much in concluding that the U.S.-born
son of Chinese immigrants (who themselves were legally barred from naturalizing
on account of their race) was a U.S. citizen.189 The publication, however, of Schuck
and Smith’s Citizenship Without Consent, which argued that the children of
undocumented immigrants are outside of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee,190
sparked a long-term debate about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
citizenship clause. Several scholars have challenged Schuck and Smiths’ conclusion
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not mandate the distribution of citizenship to
the U.S.-born children of undocumented immigrants,191 but others have adopted
187

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See Epps, supra note 89, at 352 (describing the two classes not subject to “the full
and complete jurisdiction” of the United States: children of diplomats and Indians not taxed).
189
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 705.
190
SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 114–15.
191
See, e.g., Epps, supra note 89, at 334–35; Gotanda, supra note 168, at 237–38; Allen
R. Kamp, The Birthright Citizenship Controversy: A Study of Conservative Substance and
Rhetoric, 18 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 49, 59 (2012); Gerard N. Magliocca, Indians and
Invaders: The Citizenship Clause and Illegal Aliens, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 499, 501 (2008);
David A. Martin, Membership and Consent: Abstract or Organic?, 11 YALE J. INT’L L. 278,
279 (1985) (reviewing SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10); Gerald L. Neuman, Back to Dred
Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 485, 486 (1987) (reviewing SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10);
188
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their views.192 Legislators periodically attempt to limit the Fourteenth Amendment’s
citizenship clause’s application,193 but all have failed. A recent surge in debate about
the birthright citizenship based on birth in U.S. territory194 suggests that this will be
a recurring topic of public interest.
The existing debate can be better understood within the citizenship framework
proposed in this Article. Many critics of territorial birthright citizenship argue that
the United States cannot financially support a citizenry that is increasing through
birthright citizenship.195 Because there are simply not enough jobs or tax dollars to
go around, the state must make distinctions among individuals born in the United
States. Others are more specific; they argue that the children of undocumented
immigrants are not and are unlikely to become like other U.S.-born children despite
being born in the same country.196 The children of undocumented immigrants, the
David S. Schwartz, The Amorality of Consent, 74 CAL. L. REV. 2143, 2143 (1986) (reviewing
SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10); Janet Wong, Book Review, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
746, 748 (1986) (reviewing SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10). These articles argue against
Schuck and Smith’s position that a person born of illegal immigrants should not be a citizen
within Fourteenth Amendment protection.
192
See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Birthright Citizenship for Children of Illegal Aliens: An
Irrational Public Policy, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 3 (2009); William Ty Mayton, Birthright
Citizenship and the Civic Minimum, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 221, 227 (2008); Wood, supra
note 118, at 494-95; Stevens, supra note 116, at 344–45. These articles advocate for a change
in American birthright citizenship similar to the Schuck and Smith position.
193
See, e.g., Birthright Citizenship Act of 2013, H.R. 140, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013);
Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011, S. 723, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); Birthright Citizenship
Act of 2009, H.R. 1868, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); H.R. 126, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009);
Citizenship Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 133, 110th Cong. §§ 2, 3 (2007). These bills have
varied, but they generally reinterpret the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause to
require citizenship only for children born to U.S. citizens, legal permanent residents, or aliens
serving in the armed forces. Other proposals to deny birthright citizenship to the children of
undocumented immigrants, however, concede that the Fourteenth Amendment may indeed
provide for birthright citizenship to all children born in the United States and, therefore, they
call for an amendment to the Constitution. See S.J. Res. 2, 112th Cong. (2011).
194
For example, 2016 Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has expressed
doubts that the U.S. Constitution requires the bestowal of citizenship to the children of
undocumented immigrants. Nick Gass, Trump to O’Reilly: The 14th Amendment Is
Unconstitutional, POLITICO (Aug. 19, 2015, 6:38 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/
08/donald-trump-bill-oreilly-interview-121515.html?ml=po [https://perma.cc/3CHJ-6Y27].
195
Ian Tuttle, The Very Real Economic Costs of Birthright Citizenship, NAT’L REV.
(Aug. 21, 2015, 6:40 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/422921/birthrightcitizenship-economic-costs-incentives [https://perma.cc/DW4P-ZYXM].
196
See, e.g., Wood, supra note 118, at 495-96 (“[B]ecause the parents are illegal, and
hence to some degree fearful of apprehension and deportation, their children are less likely
to participate in the wider community, to learn English, and otherwise to assimilate fully. As
a result, U.S.-born children of illegal aliens seem less likely to become fully Americanized
than the children of citizens or legal immigrants. To the extent they are not fully
Americanized before they reach voting age, their votes are less likely to be based on
traditional American values and concerns, and therefore more likely to favor policies
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argument goes, will not speak English, will not have sufficiently strong ties and
loyalty to the United States, will not engage in the U.S. political culture, or will
otherwise fail to ever become attached to the United States in a meaningful way.197
Essentially, these arguments presume that the purpose of birthright citizenship is to
identify individuals who are already like other citizens or who will become like other
citizens—that territorial birthright citizenship is predictive or descriptive in nature.
Under these arguments, territorial birthright citizenship is failing in its descriptive
or predictive role.
Generally, opponents respond to these arguments in kind. The U.S.-born
children of undocumented immigrants, they argue, are very much like their
counterparts with documented parents.198 They will go to school in the United States,
they will learn English, they will have more ties to the United States than to any
other country, they will be as informed about political debates as any other child
born in the United States, and they will consider themselves American.199 These
supporters of current U.S. citizenship practice conclude that birthright citizenship
succeeds in its descriptive and predictive role.200
Arguments on both sides are flawed and incomplete. First, it is nonsensical to
think of birthright citizenship as having any descriptive role. Infants born in the
United States cannot be said to be substantive citizens from the moment of
citizenship—birth. Infants have no real ties, no loyalty, no sense of shared identity,
no understanding of the surrounding culture, or any other factor that could
legitimately measure substantive citizenship in the United States. All infants are
indistinguishable with respect to substantive citizenship. Any discussions about

opposed by most Americans. Less rapid or complete Americanization also frequently results
in greater ethnic tensions and other problems associated with the growing multiculturalism
in our country.” (citation omitted)).
197
See id.
198
See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Making Legal: The DREAM Act, Birthright
Citizenship, and Broad-Scale Legalization, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1127, 1136-37
(2012); D. Carolina Núñez, Beyond Blood and Borders: Finding Meaning in Birthright
Citizenship, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 835, 875-80 (2013).
199
The debate surrounding the DREAM Act illustrates these assertions as well.
President Barack Obama has described undocumented immigrant children brought to the
United States at a young age: “These are young people who study in our schools, they play
in our neighborhoods, they’re friends with our kids, they pledge allegiance to our flag. They
are Americans in their heart, in their minds, in every single way but one: on paper.” Press
Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Remarks by the President on Immigration
(June 15, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarkspresident-immigration [https://perma.cc/57DB-62PD]; see also Jose Antonio Vargas,
Shadow Americans, TIME, June 25, 2012, at 34, 36–43 (discussing personal experiences with
immigrant misperceptions). If these DREAMers, brought to the country at a young age, have
acquired substantive citizenship even without formal citizenship, it is illogical to think that
similarly situated children born in the United States would not develop substantive
citizenship, particularly with the protections that formal citizenship provides.
200
See Núñez, supra note 198, at 878.
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whether the children of undocumented immigrants—or infants generally—
somehow “deserve” birthright citizenship are fatally flawed.
To the extent that arguments focus on the predictive role of territorial birthright
citizenship, those arguments are incomplete. Certainly, birthright citizenship has a
predictive role. It is not a stretch to argue that the distribution of citizenship to
individuals born in the United States identifies individuals who are likely to become
like the rest of the citizenry in some substantive way. After all, they are likely to
reside in the U.S., attend public school, and engage in activities that incorporate
them into their surrounding communities. Thus, the arguments about whether the
children of undocumented immigrants will become like other citizens are inherently
arguments about whether birthright territorial citizenship as currently understood in
the United States adequately predicts substantive citizenship. While I agree with
those who argue that the children of undocumented immigrants are very much like
their counterparts born to parents who are citizens or documented immigrants,201
these arguments fail to account for a potentially more important role that territorial
birthright citizenship plays.
As proposed in Part IV above, territorial birthright citizenship has a strong
prescriptive component, and the failure to account for the transformative role of
formal citizenship renders the current debates on birthright citizenship incomplete.
The distribution of citizenship to individuals at birth can place those individuals on
a path toward substantive citizenship. As citizens exercise their citizenship rights,
they develop the characteristics of substantive citizenship, including shared identity,
loyalty, civic-mindedness, or any other trait that is important to substantive
citizenship in the United States. In fact, that is arguably precisely what the
Fourteenth Amendment accomplished for the Americans who had previously been
excluded from citizenship by slavery.202
201

Id. at 875–80.
See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702–05 (1898) (holding an
American-born child of Chinese immigrants had citizen rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 454 (1857) (denying U.S.
citizen rights to a slave), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV;
Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Slavery, Free Blacks and Citizenship, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 487, 505
(2013) (“The Fourteenth Amendment . . . granted citizenship to all native-born black
Americans, making African American citizenship a part of the Constitution.”); Robert E.
Mensel, Jurisdiction in Nineteenth Century International Law and Its Meaning in the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 329, 354
(2013) (noting that U.S. citizenship concerns for former slaves after the Civil War culminated
in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration
Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2071 (2008) (explaining that the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments helped with the integration of immigrants); Mae M. Ngai,
Birthright Citizenship and the Alien Citizen, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521, 2528 (2007) (“For
the freed slaves, . . . access to territorial birthright citizenship has been a measure of progress
against racial inequality and subordination. [They] have recognized that citizenship is the
most elemental condition for racial equality because only citizenship guarantees the right to
be territorially present and the right to vote; in other words, it is the individual’s foundational
protection from state authority. The Fourteenth Amendment aimed precisely to accomplish
202
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The question, then, ought to be not only whether a territorial birthright
citizenship rule accurately predicts who will become a substantive citizen, but also
whether a territorial birthright citizenship rule properly identifies individuals that the
United States wants to place on the path to substantive citizenship.203 Reframing the
question in this way helps ground the varying scenarios that have raised questions
about the legitimacy of current U.S. territorial birthright citizenship practice in
appropriate language.
For example, some who challenge the current application of U.S. territorial
birthright citizenship point to evidence of noncitizen women entering the United
States as tourists to give birth and thereby secure U.S. citizenship for their children.
In a spirited critique of U.S. jus soli as currently applied, John McCaslin of the
Washington Times referenced a “huge and growing industry in Asia that arranges
tourist visas for pregnant women so they can fly to the United States and give birth
to an American. Obviously, this was not the intent of the 14th Amendment; it makes
a mockery of citizenship.”204 Judge Richard Posner later quoted McCaslin in his own
vigorous objection to the current U.S. citizenship practice.205 There are legitimate
questions about whether extending birthright citizenship to the children of tourists
temporarily in the United States adequately and effectively serves a predictive or
prescriptive function. Are the children of tourists likely to develop substantive U.S.
citizenship? Are the children of tourists part of a class of individuals we ought to
place on the citizenship path to encourage their development of substantive
citizenship?
Whatever the answer to those questions,206 there is no reason to extrapolate
those answers to the children of undocumented immigrants. Even if formal

that basic condition, to nullify Dred Scott’s exclusion of black people from citizenship.”);
Núñez, supra note 198, at 872–74 (discussing the grant of citizenship to American Indians
after the Fourteenth Amendment); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 2410, 2435 (1994) (quoting one senator’s explanation of the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment at the time of passing as an attempt to “abolish[ ] all class legislation in the
States and [do] away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not
applicable to another” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)).
203
Reframing the question in this way helps sift through the varying scenarios that have
raised questions about the birthright citizenship rule.
204
Inside the Beltway, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2002), http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2002/aug/27/20020827-041504-7305r/ [https://perma.cc/3SVZ-4NYY] (quoting
Craig Nelson, director of Friends of Immigration Law Enforcement).
205
See Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 621 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring).
206
My initial instincts with respect to the children of tourists is that, even assuming
such children are not the appropriate subjects of prescriptive citizenship rules and are
unlikely to independently become substantive citizens in the way anticipated by predictive
citizenship rules, devising a rule that excludes them while including others who are indeed
likely to become substantive citizens or who ought to be nudged toward substantive
citizenship comes at too great an administrative cost. Matthew Lister, however, is open to a
potential citizenship rule that excludes the children of tourists:
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citizenship fails to carry out any of the potential roles it could play with respect to
the substantive citizenship of U.S.-born children of tourists, that has no bearing on
whether formal citizenship fulfills an important role with respect to the substantive
citizenship of the U.S.-born children of undocumented immigrants.
I do not undertake a full analysis of the question of whether birthright
citizenship for the children of undocumented immigrants accurately and adequately
predicts or prescribes substantive citizenship—my purpose is merely to show how
the framework proposed in this Article helps illuminate current citizenship and
immigration debates—but I suggest that the children of undocumented immigrants
are precisely the individuals that ought to be nudged toward substantive citizenship.
These children are likely to remain in the United States. It would be a tragedy to
create an underclass of sub-citizens, possibly stateless individuals, who walk on an
unprotected, parallel path toward substantive citizenship or wander aimlessly on the
citizenship map without access to the formal citizenship path.207
The version of the jus soli principle that I argue is required by liberal
principles of justice, at least in any world in which we are likely to achieve in the
near future, requires that citizenship be granted to anyone born in a state who
spends any significant amount of time in the state—who “avails” himself of the
good provided by the state—before the age of maturity. This applies, with only a
few special exceptions, to anyone born in a particular state regardless of the legal
status of his parents. This approach would be weaker, however, than the current
U.S. rule because someone merely born in a state, who leaves at a very young age
and who is entitled to citizenship in another country (to prevent statelessness),
does not “avail” himself of the benefits of the society of his birth and therefore is
not entitled to citizenship.
Lister, supra note 82, at 207.
207
Not only does the conferral of birthright citizenship on the U.S.-born children of
undocumented immigrants foster those individuals’ development of substantive citizenship,
it helps integrate families and communities. As Hiroshi Motomura has described,
[Birthright citizenship] is part of the integration of immigrants into
American society. Children in immigrant families are typically much more likely
than their parents to become integrated linguistically, socially, and in other
dimensions. This is true regardless of a child’s legal status, but is even more true
for children who have lawful immigration status or citizenship, which allows them
to serve more effectively as cultural brokers between their parents and mainstream
society outside immigrant enclaves. Their brokering role often starts with
translating between their parents and teachers, not only from English but also from
the culture of the school system and American society generally. In this way, a
significant implication of both birthright citizenship and the DREAM act is
allowing children to help not just themselves integrate, but their families, too.
Motomura, supra note 198, at 1136-37; see also MOTOMURA, supra note 180, at 180–81
(“By conferring lawful status on some family members, both birthright citizenship and the
DREAM Act foster the integration of all family members, including those without lawful
immigration status.”).
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B. The DREAM Act and a “Path to Citizenship”
While the U.S.-born children of undocumented immigrants have access to the
formal citizenship path under current U.S. law, individuals who were born without
U.S. citizenship but grow up in the United States as undocumented immigrants find
themselves in a more politically fraught controversy. The ultimately failed
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2010208 (“the DREAM
Act” or “the Act”) sought to provide undocumented immigrants who arrived in the
United States as children (“DREAMers”) a path to citizenship in the United
States.209 The Act provided a three-step system that ultimately led to naturalization
for eligible noncitizens.210 Noncitizens under the age of thirty-five who had arrived
in the United States before age sixteen and had graduated from a U.S. high school
were eligible for a temporary conditional status if they were accepted into a U.S.
institution of higher education.211 They later could adjust their status to that of lawful
permanent residents after ten years and after completing two years in a bachelor’s
degree program or serving two years in the Armed Forces.212 Finally, after three
years as legal permanent residents, DREAMers would be eligible to naturalize.213
The DREAM Act, in effect, provided beneficiaries with a formal status and an
avenue for obtaining citizenship. The Act, in my analogy, would place beneficiaries
on an entrance onramp for the highway. The result for DREAMers would be
significant. They would enjoy many opportunities that were inaccessible to them as
undocumented immigrants. Legal status would open doors to education,214
employment,215 travel outside of the United States without fear of being unable to
208

S. 3992, 111th Cong. (2010).
Id. § 4; see Elisha Barron, Recent Development: The Development, Relief, and
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 623, 623, 626-31 (2011);
Mariela Olivares, Renewing the Dream: DREAM Act Redux and Immigration Reform, 16
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 79, 85-90 (2013).
210
See Barron, supra note 209, at 626-30 (conceptually dividing the DREAM Act, S.
3992 §§ 5, 6, as follows: the first step is conditional nonimmigrant status (§ 5); the second is
permanent residence (§ 6); and the third is naturalization (§ 6(k))).
211
S. 3992 § 4(a)(1)(A)–(F); Barron, supra note 209, at 627.
212
S. 3992 § 6(a), (c)–(d)(1)(D); Barron, supra note 209, at 629.
213
S. 3992 § 6(k); Barron, supra note 209, at 631.
214
For discussions of the challenges that undocumented immigrants face in access to
education and related legal developments, see Michael A. Olivas, IIRIRA, The Dream Act,
and Undocumented College Student Residency, 30 J.C. & U.L. 435, 437–52 (2004); Olivas,
supra note 69, at 108–14; Michael A. Olivas, The Political Economy of the DREAM Act and
the Legislative Process: A Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 55 WAYNE
L. REV. 1757, 1759–69 (2009) [hereinafter Olivas, The Political Economy].
215
Besides allowing formal access to work opportunities, work authorization also
removes the fear that many undocumented workers have in enforcing employment rights.
See Núñez, supra note 26, at 869–71 (discussing the difficulty of fully enforcing many
employment and workplace rights as an undocumented worker); Michael A. Olivas, Dreams
Deferred: Deferred Action, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Vexing Case(s) of DREAM Act
Students, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 463, 540–47 (2012).
209
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return, and more. Once they became citizens, they would have the right to vote and
participate in the political process.
Though the DREAM Act would not have immediately conferred citizenship on
its recipients, the framework proposed in this Article is a useful tool for
understanding the discussion surrounding the Act because public rhetoric addressed
the DREAM Act in terms of a “path to citizenship.”216 In fact, the public rhetoric
surrounding the DREAM Act in many ways mirrored the public rhetoric related to
territorial birthright citizenship.
Proponents of the DREAM Act largely framed the issue as an economic one
and a moral one. Allowing U.S.-educated children to go to college and work would
stimulate the economy, many argued.217 Some also championed the Act as the “right
thing to do.”218 It would be unfair, proponents argued, to punish individuals who
made no choice to immigrate to the United States without authorization.219
Opponents were reluctant to support the Act because, among other things, they
believed it incentivized unauthorized immigration, insufficiently disincentivized
fraud, allowed beneficiaries to petition for immigration benefits for their
undocumented immigrant relatives, and extended eligibility to too many.220 The
DREAM Act failed by a narrow margin of votes, disappointing many on both sides
of the political spectrum.221
230

See, e.g., Editorial, A Path to College, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/17/opinion/la-ed-tuition-20101117 [https://perma.cc/
BV67-6RSD].
217
Id. (“Economically, it makes sense to encourage these students to go to college; if
they become successful professionals, business owners and taxpayers in California, they will
contribute to the state’s coffers.”). For an analysis of the advocacy used during the height of
debates about the DREAM Act, see Olivares, supra note 209, at 97–98 (“Rather than
continue to engage in the same debates about the righteousness of helping the DREAMers,
advocates and legislators must change course and highlight the potential gains to the country
(not just the DREAMers) in passing the DREAM Act.” (citation omitted)).
218
See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 199 (“[S]end me the
DREAM Act . . . and I will sign it right away. . . . I will not give up on this issue, not only
because it’s the right thing to do for our economy[,] . . . not just because it’s the right thing
to do for our security, but because it’s the right thing to do, period.”); see also Editorial,
supra note 217 (“Morally, it also makes sense; it would be unfair to penalize children who
arrived in this country as minors and had no choice in the decision to come, and who
themselves committed no crime.”); Editorial, Dream Time, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2010) (on
file with the Utah Law Review), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/20/opinion/20mon2.html
(“Those who might qualify . . . are blameless for their illegal status and helpless to make it
right.”).
219
Editorial, supra note 217.
220
See Barron, supra note 209, at 623–25 (analyzing the arguments of proponents and
opponents to the DREAM Act and categorizing the types of arguments used on both sides).
221
For a comprehensive history of the genesis of the DREAM Act and the bipartisan
support it initially had, see Olivas, The Political Economy, supra note 214, at 1759–1802.
The Act’s bipartisan support may be attributed, in part, to its relatively narrow focus. That
is, while comprehensive immigration reform would likely provide many issues over which
individuals could disagree, the relatively narrow DREAM Act excluded many such issues.
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But this had not been the first and was not the last attempt to address the status
of undocumented immigrants in the United States. Prior proposals and subsequent
efforts to resurrect the DREAM Act failed without much fanfare. But it is the
alternative versions proposed by opponents of the 2010 DREAM Act that highlight
the core of the disagreement between supporters and opponents. Senator Marco
Rubio, for example, proposed a diluted version of the Act in which eligible
noncitizens would obtain legal status in the United States but would be ineligible for
citizenship.222 “You can legalize someone’s status,” he said, “without placing them
on a path toward citizenship.”223 Mitt Romney, on the other hand, favored granting
a form of residency to undocumented immigrants in exchange for military service:
“I’m delighted with the idea that people who come to this country and wish to serve
in the military can be given a path to become permanent residents of this
country . . . .”224
The alternative proposals suggest that the true opposition to the DREAM Act
was based on an understanding of formal citizenship as a purely descriptive status.
In proposing alternatives that did not lead to citizenship at all and that imposed more
specific criteria for access to formal citizenship, opponents essentially disagreed
with proponents of the original DREAM Act about whether its would-be
beneficiaries had sufficiently developed substantive citizenship. In other words,
many commentators treated the DREAM Act’s provision for access to formal
citizenship as a descriptive citizenship rule. Disagreements centered around the
question of how much substantive citizenship warranted access to formal
citizenship. Did the DREAMers have enough substantive citizenship to ultimately
become citizens? How should DREAMers prove their substantive citizenship?
Military service? High school graduation? College education?
Imagining the DREAM Act as a process that ends in formal citizenship once
those individuals have proven their substantive citizenship is certainly one valuable
way to explore the issue. It is easy to visualize the DREAMers as individuals who
are on paths parallel to the formal citizenship path, approaching substantive
citizenship, but unprotected by the rights and benefits that the formal citizenship
path provides. They grow up in the United States, attend school in the United States,
enroll in college, and likely develop all of the same qualities of substantive
citizenship that their documented and citizen counterparts do. And DREAMers do

See id. at 1789–1802 (arguing that the DREAM Act would be a perfect test case for
determining to what extent piecemeal immigration legislation could be more successful than
a comprehensive immigration solution).
222
Editorial, A Dream Act Without the Dream, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2012) (on file
with the Utah Law Review), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/opinion/a-dream-actwithout-the-dream.html.
223
Id. For other legislation proposing a path to legal status without a route to citizenship
for DREAMers, see STARS Act, H.R. 5869, 112th Cong. (2012).
224
James Oliphant, Mitt Romney Says He Would Veto DREAM Act, L.A. TIMES (Jan.
1, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/01/health/la-pn-mitt-romney-says-he-wouldveto-dream-act-20120101 [https://perma.cc/62JQ-RNVS].
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this in spite of the obstacles that their undocumented status poses. In some sense,
their development of substantive citizenship merits the grant of formal citizenship.
But these arguments are incomplete. Formal citizenship can be more than
descriptive of an individual’s substantive citizenship. Formal citizenship can also be
predictive and prescriptive. Instead of discussing formal citizenship as a final
destination that lies at the end of a “path to citizenship,” commentators must also
discuss the citizenship path itself. What might formal citizenship do to foster
substantive citizenship in DREAMers? How much faster might DREAMers develop
substantive citizenship as formal citizens rather than blazing a difficult trail? Formal
citizenship may be much more than a reward for the DREAMers’ development of
substantive citizenship; formal citizenship may also be a driving force in their
development of substantive citizenship. With formal citizenship, DREAMers would
be included in significant opportunities for substantive citizenship building. For
example, they would have increased access to educational opportunities that would,
in turn, help them contribute to their communities. DREAM Act beneficiaries might
develop increased loyalty to a country that affirmatively claims them as the
country’s own. Beneficiaries might find the prospect of political participation an
incentive for increased engagement in political debate. Again, the purpose of this
Article is not to answer the question of whether and to what extent formal citizenship
might foster substantive citizenship in DREAM Act beneficiaries, but rather to offer
a framework for recasting and renewing important debates that touch on
immigration and citizenship issues.
VI. CONCLUSION
Formal citizenship and substantive citizenship are related but not synonymous.
Though all formal citizenship rules place individuals on what I have described as
the citizenship trajectory, they do so in different ways and at different points on the
trajectory toward substantive citizenship. This view of citizenship helps explain the
coexistence of multiple, varying citizenship rules leading to equal citizenship and
reveals the often overlooked prescriptive role of citizenship. Moreover, it provides
a framework and language for future discussions of formal citizenship’s relationship
to substantive citizenship. Analyzing citizenship rules under this framework reveals
dynamics that are worth exploring.
Here, I have translated the debates surrounding territorial birthright citizenship
for the U.S-born children of undocumented immigrants and the DREAM Act into
the language of my framework. This helps illuminate the perceived role that formal
citizenship plays for commentators on both sides of these issues and highlights the
failure of many commentators to account for the other roles that formal citizenship
plays. In addition to discussing a path to citizenship, we must discuss the citizenship
path itself. That is, rather than treating formal citizenship as a reward for developing
a more substantive sense of membership and belonging, or substantive citizenship,
we must recognize formal citizenship as a mechanism for fostering that very
substantive citizenship. But the framework proposed in this Article has value in
many other debates and arenas of inquiry. How might proposals to reinstate felon-
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voting rights, for example, fit into this framework? Do the rights of citizen children
adequately protect and facilitate their development of substantive citizenship? How
did the distribution of citizenship to American Indians in the United States fit into
this framework? Ultimately, recognition of the multidimensional relationship
between formal citizenship and substantive citizenship facilitates clearer and more
productive discussion of citizenship.

